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Abstract 
Municipalities of Sweden are facing challenges complying with the GDPR. New 
and changed management processes need to be implemented. We used an inductive 
quantitative approach applying a privacy maturity framework in a survey in May 
2019 where 454 controllers in Swedish municipalities answered. Twenty-three 
measurable criteria are adopted from the technology-neutral international best-
practice standard Generally accepted privacy principles (GAPP) and objective 
descriptions in the Privacy maturity model (PMM). The results are maturity 
estimates from level 1 to 5 on the 23 criteria, which we grouped in six attributes. 
Of the controllers, 52 percent are on level 1, 44 percent on level 2, and only 4 
percent are above level 3. The survey also includes four significant findings: (1) 
Controllers in medium-large municipalities are estimating maturity higher than 
others. (2) Less than a third of the controllers have defined roles and 
responsibilities for privacy, except for the data protection officer (DPO). DPOs are 
estimating maturity even lower. (3) There is a risk for not detecting privacy 
breaches, due to lack of protection, monitoring and testing of safeguards, lack of 
controls on third-parties security practices, and treating privacy matters as IT-
security queries. Controllers working with sensitive data are rating maturity higher 
in these areas. (4) Municipalities have prioritised visible processes like a privacy 
notice, meeting requests from registered and retention practices. There are two 
strategies found – one ambitious and one cautious. Several of these findings imply 
further research. 
Keywords 
Information privacy, Privacy, Maturity model, GDPR, Sweden, Municipalities, 
Benchmarking, GAPP 
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1 Introduction 
The new legislation General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set demands for 
an increased focus on privacy for the public sector. In Sweden’s 290 
municipalities, the preparedness is supposed to be adequate, since previous laws 
had similar privacy requirements. However, the Swedish Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) believes municipalities have bigger challenges and works less 
systematically than other parts of the society, with a risk to impede the potential of 
digitalisation for public welfare, in a recent national report (Datainspektionen, 
2019b). It is crucial to gain more understanding in which fields challenges are for 
the Swedish municipalities. 
The research term implied in this thesis is information privacy. The term differs 
from physical privacy. Information and physical privacy are subsets of privacy in 
general, but for simplicity, we hereafter refer to information privacy as just privacy.  
The research area of privacy is multi-disciplinary and for information system 
research it is highly relevant because the continued growth of digitalisation leads to 
increased concern for invasive use of personal information (Bélanger & Crossler, 
2011). In a literary review in MIS Quarterly conducted by Bélanger and Crossler 
(2011), the main finding is that most studies on privacy have focused on explaining 
and predicting theoretical contributions. They also find that most literature 
regarding privacy practices is focused on privacy policies on websites in the US 
(Bélanger & Crossler, 2011). In another literary review on privacy in the same 
issue by Smith, Dinev, and Xu (2011), the researchers conclude that many 
theoretical constructs have not been addressed in empirical research on privacy. 
Also, most studies that have been conducted are on an individual level and privacy 
research foresee other areas as groups, organisational and societal levels (Smith et 
al., 2011). A conclusion is that empirical studies on privacy practices on an 
organisational and a societal level are under-researched. 
Implementing privacy practices requires an understanding of both the regulatory 
framework and a capability to translate general best practices into organisational 
processes and practices (Niemimaa & Niemimaa, 2017). The GDPR requires self-
regulation, meaning every organisation needs to adapt processes on how to prepare, 
implement and monitor management process for privacy (Kamara, 2017). A study 
with a process-oriented approach to examine how far organisations have adapted to 
handle privacy concerns will gain insights for both practitioners and into areas for 
further research. This leads to the research question: 
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What is the level of privacy maturity in municipal organisations in Sweden? 
This thesis contributes by investigating the state of maturity in Swedish 
municipalities in a web survey. We present the maturity levels of the municipalities 
of Sweden, based on a best-practice framework with objective criteria as a basis for 
measurement. The framework contains several important aspects of privacy 
management. A practitioner can use the framework to gain insight on which areas 
need improved processes and to compare their maturity over time and with others.  
We describe the following chapters of this thesis as follows. Chapter 2 defines 
privacy and frameworks, looks into best practice standards, describes maturity 
models and the current state of privacy from earlier research. Chapter 3 describes 
the framework for measuring privacy maturity. Chapter 4 covers the application of 
the framework with methodological aspects. Chapter 5 holds the results of the 
survey. Chapter 6 discusses the state of privacy maturity in a general sense for 
municipalities in Sweden, reflections on the survey, practical implications and 
proposes further research. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
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2 Theories and earlier research 
2.1 Privacy definitions 
 
The first definition of privacy as “the right to be let alone” was done by two 
lawyers almost 130 year ago in a concept of “right to privacy”  (Warren & 
Brandeis, 1890). They were concerned that the large-scale distribution of 
photography and newspapers could intrude into the personal sphere, with severe 
consequences from publication of photographs, if let unregulated. However, the 
concept was not clearly established and too vague for law-making (Solove, 2002).  
Defining privacy is very difficult. There are several categories of definitions which 
partly overlap, but still are conceptually very different, according to Daniel J. 
Solove (2006), and they serve different purposes and separate perspectives. This 
reasoning fits in with Wittgenstein’s family resemblance concept where: something 
which could be considered to be connected by one essential common characteristic 
may be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one 
characteristic is common to all of the elements (Wittgenstein, 1953). We will 
briefly describe four paths that follow on defining privacy from a philosophical 
standpoint. 
Firstly, Alan F Westin coined the modern definition of information privacy as “the 
claim of individuals...to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent 
information about them is communicated” (Westin, 1967). He claims an 
individual’s anonymity is a desired state in the public sphere as well as being 
reserved–while in a large group having the ability to maintain a psychological 
distance by avoiding communication. We can make parallels with current privacy 
laws from this perspective to give the individual control via a choice, a consent, on 
how personal information is to be processed.  
Secondly, Solove understands privacy as an umbrella term for activities and 
mechanisms that violate the individual’s private sphere (Solove, 2006). He 
proposes a taxonomy for privacy-threatening activities which can be used to 
determine effects when implementing new services. These activities include, for 
example, surveillance, interrogation, information disclosure, appropriation, 
secondary use, distortion etc. Not all of them are technological activities, but rather 
the result of actions by humans, especially by people in organizations and 
governments (Solove, 2006).  
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Thirdly, Helen Nissenbaum use the term contextual integrity, instead of privacy1, 
with “norms of information” to govern collection, use and dissemination of 
information, and that individuals own expectations are specific to different kinds of 
situations (Nissenbaum, 2004). She insists that one must pay attention to details 
and view privacy in a context-related perspective and the flow of information. 
Norms vary across different cultures, time-periods, geographical locations and so 
do perspectives on violation of privacy. From a practitioner’s perspective, this 
raises a challenge to identify and harmonize with, sometimes conflicting, norms 
when introducing new technology.  
Lastly, Calo (2011) introduces the concept of privacy harm from the perception of 
the kind of harm inflicted upon the individual. Objective harm is direct, measurable 
and can be observed. Subjective harm is a potential violation, is indirect and 
unmeasurable. The subjective harm can occur even if no action is taken by the one 
intruding on privacy. Both subjective and objective harm can have the same 
negative impact on an individual. To avoid negative perception of harm, one must 
build trust-worthy and transparent communication of information processing 
practices.  
One conclusion can be made from these four viewpoints on privacy definitions: 
Privacy is a complex concept, and perhaps it is not even possible to reach a 
consensus on a definition. Solove (2006) declares that “Privacy is a concept in 
disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means…”. Privacy fits into the description 
of an essentially contested concept, where endless disputes can take place on the 
meaning of the concept, without reaching consensus, for example, “art”, 
“democracy”, ”social justice” and so on (Gallie, 1955). The difficulty to grasp the 
concept of privacy implies the transformation of privacy concerns into regulations 
or management practices is a complicated task. Therefore, the four theories above 
can be seen as the starting point, rather than providing direct detailed prescriptions 
and instruments grounded in one universal definition. 
Also, the four perspectives above address privacy for the individual. Policies and 
regulations classically address privacy from the perspective of the individual and 
with a conception of privacy as an individual human right (Bennett & Raab, 2018). 
To understand the individual conceptions link to practices, there is a need to 
understand the privacy concerns, risks and vulnerabilities for the individuals 
(Karwatzki, Trenz, Tuunainen, & Veit, 2017), and address privacy risks as links in 
a system chain of  “technologies–policies–processes–people–society–economy–
legislature” (Lowry, Dinev, & Willison, 2017).  The scope for this thesis includes 
                                                 
1 Branting (2016) reflects on that the translation of privacy to Swedish as personlig integritet is 
different from what Nissenbaum uses with contextual integrity and suggests that the term refers to 
something more like a contextual personal sphere. The word integrity is in the USA not used as a 
synonym for privacy. 
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addressing privacy risk by researching practical aspects of the policy and 
processes.  
2.2 Privacy risk 
Mason (1986) predicted rightly, among other things, that information technology 
will increase threats for privacy, as an ethical issue in the new information age. The 
world today is quite different from the 1980s, and these concerns are becoming a 
focal point. Lowry et al. (2017) claim privacy should now be regarded as being at 
the centre of IS research, due to the ever-increasing privacy concerns regarding 
online platforms, the internet of things and big data. 
Privacy risks have abstract definitions in privacy research, as either opportunistic 
behaviour with loss of control of personal information or substantial adverse 
outcomes for the individual with the release of personal data, according to 
(Karwatzki et al., 2017). In general risk literature, a more differentiated 
understanding is found, where risk is perceived as the adverse consequences of 
negative outcomes of a situation, and the likelihood of their occurrence (Karwatzki 
et al., 2017). 
Since a violation of privacy can be subjective (Calo, 2011), the concerns of threats 
and risk must be seen on the potential harm that can occur (Solove, 2008). For 
organisations to address individuals concerns for privacy risks, mitigation 
mechanisms such as adapting and changing organisational practices are needed 
(Karwatzki et al., 2017). This necessity would imply transparency and preventive 
mechanisms to ease the concern of the individuals. However, organisations primary 
privacy concerns reflect the information the organisation possesses and how to 
implement management practices best to comply with both regulations and 
maximise business priorities (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011). The link between the 
individual and the organisation would be weak without the laws.   
Next section describes the general privacy frameworks and principles for privacy 
concepts introduced in laws and practices. 
2.3 Privacy frameworks 
Privacy frameworks are expressions used for various processes-oriented templates, 
tools, laws and standards. A definition of privacy framework, used by the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), is: 
”An implementation roadmap that provides the structure or checklists (documented 
privacy procedures and processes) to guide the privacy professional through 
privacy management and prompts them for the details to determine all privacy-
relevant decisions for the organization.” (Densmore, 2016). 
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Information security practices are related to privacy (Lowry et al., 2017), but the 
theoretical relationship is diverted into which perspective is a part of which. 
(Krumay & Oetzel, 2011). The concept of privacy frameworks is less 
comprehensive and far less specific than information security concepts. Privacy 
frameworks are lacking a common body of knowledge for implementation 
(Krumay & Oetzel, 2011). Information security, with its triad of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA), have for example long-time, well-established 
standards like the ISO/IEC 27000-series with pre-defined general requirements to 
implement controls and govern implementation (ISO/IEC, 2013). Still, efforts have 
emerged for supporting implementation in managing privacy since the 1970s. 
Legal privacy frameworks typically answer the question: “What must be done?”. 
There are several significant international laws and regulations, but here we 
mention some Swedish examples in a European context. Examples of laws in 
Sweden are: The first-ever national privacy law, the Swedish Datalag (1973:289); 
the national law Personuppgiftslagen (1998:204), based on Data Protection 
Directive2  (European Parliament, 1995); and the far-reaching GDPR 
(European Parliament, 2016), with increased obligations for organizations and 
hefty fines for non-compliance. 
Other regulatory frameworks with principles for privacy include, for example; the 
Fair Information Practices (FIPs) with origins in the early 1970s from the 
US Department of Health & Human Services (1973) and later updated by the 
Privacy Privacy Protection Study Commission (1977) with a basic set of principles 
and have generated several modern privacy legislation. The most widely accepted 
privacy principles are from the 1980s, the OECD Guidelines on the protection of 
privacy and transborder flows of personal data together with the Council of 
Europe’s Convention 108, which both are a basis for both the Data Protection 
Directive and the GDPR (Ustaran, 2017). 
To sum up, privacy frameworks are yet to evolve, but a stem of both practice and 
laws have emerged. Several laws and also other regulations are setting 
requirements to answer the what-question. The regulators give organisations 
guidance on what principles are needed to implement, but not how, and then 
remain in the background to enforce sanctions if laws are breached (Bennett & 
Raab, 2018). For practical use of how organisations need to address compliance, 
one must look into privacy standard frameworks. 
GDPR is technology-neutral and laws do not change as fast as technology. GDPR 
also holds an accountability principle. Organisations need to use privacy 
management to facilitate accountability and standards to provide the means for 
implementing processes for the use of personal data in technology (Kamara, 2017). 
                                                 
2 The term Data Protection is introduced by the EU and translates to Swedish by the word by 
“Dataskydd”. Both are synonymous with privacy. 
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As technology changes, so must the internal processes support improvement to 
continue to be compliant to the law.  
2.4 Privacy standards 
Privacy research from the business practices perspective is a new area (Kauffman, 
Lee, Prosch, & Steinbart, 2011). Standards for how to implement privacy principles 
are hard to find to comply with the GDPR. The OECD Guidelines form a basis for 
common understanding and are implemented in several laws, but are of less 
practical value for management since the articles within are high-level aims and 
principles (Ustaran, 2017)  
In 2015, the European Commission issued the first standardisation request to the 
European Standardization Organisations to develop privacy management standards 
(Kamara, 2017). One emerging standardisation effort is the ISO/IEC-29000-series 
of privacy frameworks (ISO/IEC, 2011, 2015). However, these frameworks are not 
yet a complete standard. An International standard organisation (ISO) technical 
committee is currently working on a standard called ISO/IEC 27550 (ISO/IEC, 
2019; van Dijk, Tanas, Rommetveit, & Raab, 2018). The outcome from European 
standardisation efforts is not ready to use. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, a new standard is being created by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). They are creating a framework for 
specifically privacy to help organisations to identify better, assesses, manage, and 
communicate about privacy risks, which is expected to roll out under 2019 (NIST, 
2019). An earlier framework by NIST is SP 500-83 Revision 4, which address both 
cybersecurity and privacy risks for US federal information systems and 
organisations (NIST, 2013), where 26 controls for privacy have the scope to 
comply with the 1974 US Privacy Act. It is fair to assume the both the SP 500-83 
Revision 4 and the new NIST Privacy framework are far from the current European 
legislation.  
Privacy-by-Design (PbD) is another example standard framework. PbD contains 
seven principles and was created by Ann Cavoukian (2009) to help organisations to 
design-in protections at every stage in developing products and services. To 
comply with PbD is a legal requirement in the GDPR. Though PbD is an excellent 
approach to adopt privacy-thinking into service engineering practices early, it is a 
strategic manifesto of privacy principles, rather than criteria for a how-to 
implementation. It is also would require further adaption and creation of 
measurable criteria, before using it in a research survey. 
Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) is a framework standard that is 
addressing privacy practices in particular. A task force developed it from the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian 
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Institute of Chartered Accountants (AICPA/CICA, 2011a). GAPP is not a law but 
can be regarded as a best-practice standard for compliance with several privacy 
laws, even though compliance is not mentioned (Govender, 2015). The GAPP 
standard framework was created as a joint effort to interweave several major 
international privacy laws and best practices. It a solid benchmark for good privacy 
practices (Govender, 2015), and have also been used as a framework for analysing 
literature and research regarding privacy (Kauffman et al., 2011). 
GAPP consists of ten principles, with 73 objective and measurable criteria for each 
principle. The 73 criteria cover how internal policies and communications should 
be implemented, as well as descriptive criteria for procedures and controls. GAPP 
is technology-neutral (Gable, 2014). The ten GAPP-principles are shown in Table 
1. The framework is built from a business perspective and operationalizes 
requirements and is meant to guide organizations on how to develop, implement 
and manage privacy programs to address privacy obligations, risks, and business 
opportunities (AICPA/CICA, 2011a). It is partly based on the ISO-27002 standard 
controls for information security. (Gable, 2014). Schroeder and Cohen (2011) 
express GAPP is a scalable tool for addressing privacy risks, and the main 
application is that personal information is collected, used, retained and disclosed in 
accordance with an organization's privacy policy. The privacy functions also need 
to be well-aligned with the overall information governance framework within an 
organization to enable successful compliance, risk-reduction, and efficiency and 
GAPP is a vehicle to support that (Goodman, 2018). 
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Table 1 
The 10 generally accepted privacy principles  (AICPA/CICA, 2011a) 
Principle  
1. Management The entity defines, documents, communicates, and assigns accountability 
for its privacy policies and procedures 
2. Notice The entity provides notice about its privacy policies and procedures and 
identifies the purposes for which personal information is collected, used, 
retained, and disclosed. 
3. Choice and consent The entity describes the choices available to the individual and obtains 
implicit or explicit consent with respect to the collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information. 
4. Collection The entity collects personal information only for the purposes identified in 
the notice. 
5. Use, retention, and 
disposal 
The entity limits the use of personal information to the purposes identified 
in the notice and for which the individual has provided implicit or explicit 
consent. The entity retains personal information for only as long as 
necessary to fulfill the stated purposes or as required by law or regulations 
and thereafter appropriately disposes of such information. 
6. Access The entity provides individuals with access to their personal information 
for review and update. 
7. Disclosure to third 
parties 
The entity discloses personal information to third parties only for the 
purposes identified in the notice and with the implicit or explicit consent 
of the individual. 
8. Security for privacy The entity protects personal information against unauthorized access (both 
physical and logical). 
9. Quality The entity maintains accurate, complete, and relevant personal 
information for the purposes identified in the notice. 
10. Monitoring 
and enforcement 
The entity monitors compliance with its privacy policies and procedures 
and has procedures to address privacy related complaints and disputes. 
 
Dennedy, Fox, and Finneran (2014) claim GAPP is the most comprehensive 
privacy framework available and can be aligned with other different standards and 
other legal privacy frameworks on key principles. See a comparison in Table 2 
aligning the GAPP, the OECD Guidelines, the EU Data Protection Directive 
(European Parliament, 1995), the Federal Trade Commission’s version of the Fair 
Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs) which is a later version of the (FIPs), the 
ISO 27002 security controls, and the GDPR. 
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Table 2 
Alignment of privacy frameworks, standards and law. Adapted from Dennedy et al. (2014). 
GAPP  OECD 
Guidelines  
FTC FIPPS  EU Directive  ISO 27002  [GDPR]3 
1. Management  
   
Operations 
Management 
Responsibilities of 
controllers and 
processors, Records of 
processing activities, 
Personal data breaches 
2. Notice  Specification 
of Purpose 
 
Transparency 
 
Information, 
communication 
obligations 
3. 
Choice/Consent  
Individual 
Participation 
Choice/Consent 
 
Asset 
Management  
Consent 
4. Collection Collection 
Limitation  
 
Proportionality  Information 
Acquisition  
Principles for 
processing. Processing 
of special categories  
5. Use, 
Retention, 
Disposal 
Use Limitation 
 
Legitimate 
Purpose  
Asset 
Management  
Purpose limitations, 
Data minimisation, 
Storage limitations 
6. Access  Openness Access/Participation 
 
Access 
Control  
Rights of the data 
subject 
7. Disclosure to 
Third Parties 
  
Transfer of 
personal data 
to third parties 
 
Transfer of personal 
data to third parties, 
third countries or 
international 
organisations 
8. Security for 
Privacy  
Security 
Safeguards 
Integrity/Security 
 
Security Integrity and 
confidentiality, 
Security of processing 
9. Quality Data Quality  Notice/Awareness  
  
Accuracy 
10. Monitoring 
and 
Enforcement  
Accountability Enforcement/Redress Supervisory 
authority 
Compliance Supervisory 
authorities, Data 
protection impact 
assessment, 
Accountability 
                                                 
3 GDPR is added by the authors, since the alignment table is out-dated regarding EU-legislation. 
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To the best of our knowledge, a complete non-proprietary privacy standard 
framework, to measure the level of implementation of privacy management of 
organisations, is the GAPP framework. It is technology-neutral, scalable and a 
solid base for benchmarking. It contains 73 measurable objective privacy criteria 
which are covering the requirements of the GDPR. Moreover, a privacy maturity 
model is created based on GAPP, to measure privacy maturity in organisations. 
Next section elaborates the concept of maturity models. 
2.5 Maturity models 
The concept of maturity models has sprung from the idea that organisational 
improvement is best developed in different stages – a step-by-step approach. Nolan 
(1973) first described a stage-theory model for the planning and controlling of 
computer resources in an organization, which is widely adopted (Pöppelbuß & 
Röglinger, 2011). In the late 1980s Humphrey et al (1987) created the first version 
of the capability maturity model (CMM) for the use of improving software 
engineering in an organisation. In the 1990s the CMM was updated to a 1.1 version 
(Paulk, Curtis, Chrissis, & Weber, 1993) which is the foundation for a plenitude of 
maturity models.  
The CMM 1.1 have a good description of immature versus mature organisations. 
(Paulk et al., 1993) states that: “The immature software organisation is reactionary 
and often solving crises (better known as firefighting). Schedules and budget are 
routinely exceeded because they are not based on realistic estimations… [and] has 
no objective way to judge quality.”; and that “A mature organisation possesses an 
organization-wide ability to manage development and maintenance… and work 
activities are carried out according to planned processes.” The CMM 1.1 have five 
levels on an ordinal scale, 1 to 5, to measure process maturity and evaluate 
capacity, see Figure 1.  
• Level 1, Initial, is the starting point, where success depends on individuals 
and cannot be repeated without the competence and heroic ad hoc co-
workers.  
• Level 2, Repeatable, is stable since process is disciplined with better 
planning; and successes can be repeated.  
• Level 3, Defined, is consistent and a standard is set. Roles and 
responsibilities are clear and common processes are shared organization-
wide. 
• Level 4, Managed, is predictable and quantifiable, since processes are 
measured. Problems are identified and corrective actions are taken. 
• Level 5, Optimized, is a state of continuous improvements by incremental 
and innovative improvements in a planned way. 
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Figure 1 Maturity framework CMM 1.1 with five levels (Paulk et al., 1993) 
Closely related to privacy are maturity models for Information security. Several 
Information Security Maturity models (ISMM) exist; Karokola, Kowalski, and 
Yngström (2011) analyse eight ISMM and create a proposal a model for secure e-
government, which is tested in Tanzania; Ricardo dos Santos, Becker Westphall, 
Alencar Rigon, and Merkle Westphall (2014) create an ISMM with six stages and 
an evaluation model based on the 133 controls in ISO/IEC 27002 standard 
(ISO/IEC, 2013); The Open Group (2011) have created a ISMM called Open 
Information Security Management Maturity Model (O-ISM3) with five levels 
based on several standards, with main focus to serve strategic and broad process 
improvement, rather than risk and security (Karokola et al., 2011); Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CobiT) have a six stage scale, 
which have been tested in an self-administrated survey on 970 individuals in 
Malaysian Public Service organizations, with the result of almost 2/3 are on level 3 
(Dzazali, Sulaiman, & Zolait, 2009). However, these maturity models are not 
covering the all the specific aspects of privacy, which are not security-related. 
The Privacy maturity model (PMM) has a five-level scale similar to the CMM 1.1 
(AICPA/CICA, 2011b). The PMM is based on GAPP’s 10 principles and 73 
criteria. Thus, multiplied by five maturity levels, this makes a total of 365 level 
descriptions that objectively and concretely define what should be done to match 
each level. The criteria and level descriptions are based on best practices provided 
by AICPA and CICA professionals. Similarly, the 133 controls of ISO/IEC 27002 
are also best practice-oriented (Ricardo dos Santos et al., 2014). In this thesis the 
survey measurement basis is supported by criteria and level descriptions of the 
PMM. Also, the PMM is base for the framework used in the survey. 
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2.6 Critique of maturity models 
Maturity models in their different forms are subject for criticism. Benbasat, Dexter, 
Drury, and Goldstein (1984) criticise the stage-theory model for its lack of 
evidence of robustness and reliability. They also claim that different criteria for 
maturity do not consistently progress together and also could transgress in opposite 
directions. In other words, maturity does not evolve stage by stage.  
Other criticism expressed by King and Kraemer (1984) suggests that the 
assumptions of the model are too simplistic to come to real use and that the model 
cannot be used for making predictions as intended. Furthermore, they question the 
empirical foundation of evidence for the model. Note, that this was written in the 
1980s, and since then a lot of empirical evaluation has been provided.  
Teo and King (1997) point out that the possibility of moving backwards through 
stages or progressing through the stages in an alternative order is not included in 
the stage-theory model.  
As for criticism of the CMM, Pfeffer and Sutton (1999) complain that although this 
model might be useful indicating when something needs to be done, the maturity 
model does not very often advise how to take action to progress through the model.  
Critique regarding the insufficiency of reflection on maturity is brought forth by 
Wendler (2012) who also criticises the uncritical use of influences from the 
industry and the absence of validation. 
Since the intentions were to create a framework that in some way involves 
maturity, this criticism needs to be considered. Firstly, the scope of this thesis is 
limited to the domain of maturity of privacy. It is a limited domain constrained by 
external environmental factors such as laws. If the laws change and invalidate the 
fundamentals of the model, usefulness of the assessments of maturity will be gone. 
In that sense, maturity may be seen as a static state. Secondly, the research question 
includes a comparative aspect on a national level. To make a purposeful 
comparative maturity model, it includes objective criteria for internal and external 
benchmarking (Pöppelbuß & Röglinger, 2011).  
2.7 Current state of privacy readiness 
Internationally, several privacy surveys have been performed on a large scale in 
companies, mostly by large consultant firms, whose interest is mainly in progress 
towards compliance with the GDPR and the usage of tools, recourses, and global 
challenges. In a worldwide study by the IAPP, called the Privacy Governance 
Report 2018, respondents were asked to self-evaluate the maturity of their privacy 
programs in early, mid or mature stages and the results showed that in 
organisations under 5000 employees, 29 percent were perceiving themselves as 
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early; and in large organisations, with over 75000 employees, 57 percent were 
mature  (IAPP-EY, 2018). Another study by the Ponemon institute where more 
than 1000 companies in EU and USA are represented shows that 69 percent is 
working ad hoc or have no governance data program; of the 31 percent that do have 
a program running, only 15 percent say they are at a mature stage, where 
“…activities are deployed, maintained and/or refined across the enterprise” 
(Ponemon, 2018). 
A Swedish Government parliamentary committee outlined IT-related risks for 
breaches of privacy in the society and concluded that the individual’s privacy is 
diminishing in several areas (Integritetskommittén, 2016). The committee has 
classified risks in three levels; some risk, obvious risk and serious risk. Risks 
concerning large quantities of sensitive personal data in municipalities are found in 
schools, working life, social services, health care and E-government, and there are 
also serious risks related to municipalities and big data, cloud services and 
biometry (Integritetskommittén, 2016). A summary of privacy risks associated to 
municipalities can be found in Appendix 4 – Privacy risks areas in the 
municipalities. 
Privacy and information security (IS) are related topics and studies can be 
elaborated from this field into the privacy area. The Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency (MSB) made a study on information security in 2015, where 270 of 290 
municipalities participated. The results are: 40 percent of the municipalities do not 
have a responsible person for IS; 25 percent have less than a 10 percent full-time 
employee working with IS; 68 percent are not working systematically with IS; and 
55 percent have no process for management and reporting of IS-incidents (MSB, 
2015, 2016). Regarding privacy capabilities for municipalities, one may expect a 
similar state of affairs. 
A recent national survey by the Swedish DPA show municipalities is facing 
challenges (Datainspektionen, 2019b). The target group of study was Data 
Protection Offices (DPOs) for both private and public sectors. DPOs are a legal 
obligation for all public sector authorities with their administration bodies 
(hereafter named controllers). 396 of 1687 DPOs from municipalities or regions 
answered the survey. 92 percent of these 396 came from municipalities. Counting 
only DPOs from municipalities, this means that 363 answered the survey. Some 
illustrating differences with lower assessment from municipal and regional DPOs 
than the rest are; (1) the organisation is not working systematically; (2) the 
employees of the controllers have less knowledge of the GDPR; and (3) the 
management is less aware of privacy and is giving this a lower priority. 
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3 A privacy maturity framework 
This chapter focuses on the development of a framework, used to measure privacy 
maturity in municipalities. The application of the framework is to systematically 
categorise how well municipal organisation use best-practice privacy management 
processes by using a self-administered questionnaire. The maturity level should not 
be regarded as an audit of legal compliance of the municipalities. Instead, then it 
should be considered as a systematic attempt to collect a self-evaluation of the 
management approach and process maturity for privacy. 
We created the framework in an iterative approach. See Figure 2 for an overview 
of creating the Privacy maturity framework. 
First, we made a conceptual analysis and decomposition of the level descriptions in 
the PMM. Second, we created a questionnaire covering the complete PMM with 
134 questions. A description of the question construction is found in the second 
section. Third, we tested the questionnaire in a pilot study with practitioners in one 
municipality. Forth, based on feedback from the pilot, we analysed the 
questionnaire, resulting in a reduction of questions (and criteria). Fifth, we created 
six grouping attributes as a result of further analysis and from the feedback, and 
then we created a new second questionnaire with some control questions and 
questions for correlation. Sixth, we performed a second pilot on the reduced 
questionnaire, with the same group of practitioners as in the first pilot and also 
added some respondents from other municipalities. The second pilot received a 
positive response in feedback from testers. Seventh, we adjusted some questions, 
and then we created an analysis template with the final scoring of the questions. 
Last, we deployed the final questionnaire in a web survey, described in chapter 4 
with research settings, sample, and other methodological aspects. 
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Figure 2 Development of the framework 
3.1 Conceptual analysis 
The outset of the framework is the PMM (AICPA/CICA, 2011b), based on GAPP 
(AICPA/CICA, 2011a). The PMM provides 10 principles, 73 criteria and 365 level 
descriptions. Each of the level descriptions for the criteria in PMM is quite similar, 
but with different concrete descriptions for what is required to reach each level. See 
the example of the level descriptions in Figure 3. The first three levels in each 
criterion offer exclusive different degrees of process maturity, from ad hoc (level 
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1), then repeatable (level 2) and to a defined process (level 3). The two top-levels 
include added descriptions for managed (level 4) and optimized (level 5). Level 3 
is in the PMM regarded as a mature state (AICPA/CICA, 2011b) and the same 
reasoning applies of maturity applies on organisations in the CMM (Paulk et al., 
1993). 
 
Figure 3 Example of a privacy maturity model criteria (AICPA/CICA, 2011b) 
The different criteria in GAPP are grouped into aspects of either “Policies and 
Communications” or “Procedures and Controls”. Ten of the criteria deal with 
policies within each of the principles and there is a similar situation with criteria 
for Communication. This similarity means that 20 criteria are almost identical in 
the level descriptions of the PMM. See Appendix 1 – GAPP principles and criteria 
for a complete list of for all principles, criteria and aspects. 
The principles are a way of sorting the criteria with headers and the grouping into 
aspects does not contain any information other than forming a structure. The 
distribution of criteria for the principles is found in Table 3. A lot of useful basis 
for measurement is found within the first principle, the Management principle, 
where several criteria can guide procedures to test in practice (Kauffman et al., 
2011). For example, 1.1.0 Privacy policies can be used to measure the scope of 
internal policies;  1.1.2 Responsibility and accountability for policies can determine 
the sheer existents of a privacy function and how extensive it is;  1.2.4 Risk 
assessment can be used to measure the risk-based approach of the organisation;  
1.2.7 Incident and breach management can be used for measuring the procedures 
and preparedness for personal data breaches and mitigation strategies; 1.2.8 
Supporting personal can give a measuring for the seniority of privacy personnel; 
and 1.2.10 Privacy awareness and training can be used to measure the strategy of 
training and awareness for personnel in general. All of these crucial principles to 
determine practices in key aspects of privacy management are concentrated in one 
principle. The point is, there is an uneven balance between the different principles. 
Possibly, there could be other ways of grouping the criteria into something else 
than the principles. One way would be to use the principles found in different 
legislations on which GAPP is based on could be one possible way of grouping the 
criteria. Another way of grouping the criteria could be on the functional aspects of 
an organisation. The criteria purposefully hold meaningful granular information to 
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describe how processes should be performed and this can be grouped in several 
ways, without losing the relevance found the criteria. 
Table 3 
Distribution of GAPP criteria grouped in the different principles 
Principle Criteria 
1. Management 14 
2. Notice 5 
3. Choice and consent 7 
4. Collection 7 
5. Use, retention, and disposal 5 
6. Access 8 
7. Disclosure to third parties 7 
8. Security for privacy 9 
9. Quality 4 
10. Monitoring and enforcement 7 
Total 73 
 
Some of the criteria descriptions and the level descriptions are quite wordy. A 
comprehensive approach would be to try to catch all content in the descriptions and 
create an extensive questionnaire. However, it would not be feasible to accomplish 
and use for our research question, including a nation-wide aspect of the “…privacy 
maturity in municipal organisations in Sweden”. Respondents would not likely give 
answers to such a far-reaching approach. The question designer should have a 
respondent perspective and not burden the respondents more than necessary  
(Persson, Fjelkegård, Hartwig, & Sundström, 2016). With this in mind, there is a 
need to simplify the wordy descriptions used in PMM, when constructing questions 
and answers. The trade-off between the comprehensive and the minimalistic 
approaches is that the exactness with detailed information is lost, but there is still 
general information identified pointing towards the privacy maturity. Next section 
explains how we used a paradigm to systematically create the minimalistic 
approach for handling the detailed and wordy criteria level descriptions. 
3.2 Questionnaire construction 
The questionnaire was created using the Goal-Question-Metric (GQM) paradigm, 
which has its origin in software engineering (Basili, 1989; Van Solingen, Basili, 
Caldiera, & Rombach, 2002). GQM has been used to erect metrics in a variety of 
different research contexts. For example in maturity model for documentation 
process (Visconti & Cook, 1998), accountability for could services (Nuñez, 
Fernández-Gago, & Luna, 2016) process assessments for IT service management 
(Shrestha, Cater-Steel, Toleman, & Tan, 2014). GQM offers a structured approach 
with a three levels top-down decomposition, from a conceptual level with the goal 
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to suit the needs, through an operational level where questions are created and to a 
quantitative level where the resulting metrics are scored (Basili, 1989; Van 
Solingen et al., 2002). See Figure 4. The point is to link measurement to overall 
goals because a set of measurements can be more successful with the goals in mind 
(Visconti & Cook, 1998). 
 
Figure 4 The Goal-Question-Metric paradigm (Nuñez et al., 2016). 
In developing the framework, the primary goal is linking the assessment on a level 
of granularity for each area on the criteria level. The criteria description and level 
descriptions (policies, artefacts or practices) become the goal on a conceptual level. 
These are broken down to concrete questions with response options to match the 
level descriptions (operational level). The responses to the question are then used to 
score the maturity level within each criterion (quantitative level). See Figure 5 
 
Figure 5 The GQM paradigm applied on the framework for question creation. 
The construction of the full survey in Swedish contains a minimum of 71 and a 
maximum of 134 questions, depending on which path through the questionnaire the 
respondent will take. The response options are in general closed single-choice filter 
questions for the level 1-3 and multiple-choice questions for the supplementary 
questions. In general, ratings are given on a sequence of questions starting with a 
filter question, and then one or two follow up questions, as in the example above. 
The number of questions for each criterion depended on whether if the level 
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descriptions in the PMM contained mutually exclusive descriptions. As an 
example, we use the case of the criterion 6.2.2, where the levels 1-3 are mutually 
exclusive to the different degrees of process maturity; one question addressed this. 
The two follow-up questions require that the respondent answered response 3. The 
levels 4-5 if scored if answered “yes”. In the case for question 37, also the answer 
“partially” were considered and resulted in maturity level 4, since the maturity is 
between level 4 and 5. See the questions (translated to English) in the example and 
how it connects with the wordy level descriptions in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 Example of questions and their link to level descriptions in the PMM  
In some cases, all five maturity levels are achievable in a one question answer, 
which is the case in questions 21 and 29. We also use different ways for ratings of 
these questions. In question 21, it is sufficient to select either one of the levels 1-4 
answers to get the score of maturity 1 to 4. The highest possible answer gives the 
maturity level. Only level 5 also requires the level 4 answer. In question 29, all 
lower levels are needed to gain a higher level, and it is harder to obtain a high 
rating based on these conditions.  
Some questions do not rate maturity at all, since there are no corresponding 
maturity in the PMM or there are no description available to determine maturity 
objectively. For example, question 11 “How often do you carry out and update 
assessments in your risk management?”, does not say much about the quality of the 
risk assessments or process-oriented maturity. Rather this is included as a control 
question and for finding possible correlations.  
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Since the target group of the survey is controllers in Swedish municipalities, the 
survey is written in Swedish and a familiar vocabulary for the municipalities of 
Sweden is used4. 
More, we added some questions and answers which do point to a level of maturity 
but are not part of the GAPP framework Aforementioned, most of the GAPP 
criteria are technology neutral, as are most privacy laws, especially the GDPR. By 
adding more of concrete and technical descriptions as options for answers, it would 
possibly become easier for respondents to answer, since current technology is 
easier to relate to, than abstract descriptions. These answers may be objective and 
can be linked to maturity, but the answers are not technology neutral. An example 
is in question 12 “An IT tool is used for handling and documentation of risks (Not 
excel or equivalent)”. Moreover, we have included the possibility to add comments 
to multiple choice questions. This gives input to more descriptions, which can be 
added in the future as a sign of maturity level.  
As mentioned in the analysis above, this means that 20 criteria are almost identical 
in the level descriptions of the PMM. Regarding questions on Policies and 
Communications, we only use one criterion each. This approach is the first version 
of the questionnaire directly covering 53 criteria, with its 134 questions. 
3.3 Pilot on the first questionnaire 
A group of eight practitioners within one municipality did a first pilot test on the 
first version, covering the full range of criteria in GAPP, with a minimum of 71 and 
a maximum of 134 questions. Each of the respondents has professional skills in 
privacy issues within different areas in the municipality, and they are well-known 
by one of the authors. The respondents had six days to complete the questionnaire 
between April 3rd and 8th 2019. Only one person out of eight answered the pilot 
survey, and it took around 45 minutes. Another person had started but dropped out. 
The respondents gave feedback at a meeting, and there we had a sum-up discussion 
with them. The common conclusion at the meeting was that the questionnaire was 
too long to be feasible for a wide-spread national survey. Lengthy and tiresome 
sessions for the respondents are known to increase the risk of respondents attrition, 
especially fielding new studies that have not been previously tested or validated 
(Hochheimer et al., 2016). We also had a workshop with the one who answered the 
complete survey. To walk through all the answers took almost three hours. 
                                                 
4 For example, the word “dokumenthanteringsplan” is used as a term in the concept of “Use, 
retention and disposal”. 
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3.4 Scope reduction 
A scope reduction was used to adapt the framework into the field of study of a 
municipality context. Therefore, we considered common privacy practices and 
risks in a municipality as a basis to contextualise the framework and reduce the 
questionnaire. We conducted an analysis of the questionnaire based on the 
feedback from the pilot. The analysis was done on the question level to find key 
practices among the answers and to find the most relevant criteria to use for 
assessment. The review process was a bottom-up approach to handle the GQM 
paradigm in reverse. See the example below in Figure 7. As input, we used three 
guiding principles from the feedback of the pilot and literature. 
First, we used a risk-based approach with key practices found in literature, and the 
criteria covering those key practices are prioritised. A risk-based approach is 
central and propagated by the GDPR legislation, stating in Article 32 that the 
“…the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational 
measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk” 
(European Parliament, 2016). As explained above mature practices is found in the 
level 3 descriptions of the criteria in the PMM, which is considered a mature state 
(AICPA/CICA, 2011b). See Table 4 below for the key practices identified in the 
first questionnaire.  
Second, we filtered out the questions that could be redundant. Another requirement 
for calculating the completeness of a maturity levels is that all levels need to be 
possible to reach in each criterion. In some cases, questions are needed to get a 
complete set of maturity from 1-5. In other cases, we deemed it possible to get the 
score for levels 4-5 in another question, so then these were set as redundant too. 
Third, with the feedback from the pilot, we removed questions not common in a 
municipality context. To sum up, in the analysis we have given the following 
prioritisation score to questions that are: 
1 for questions we consider as a key practice or are needed for completeness. 
2 for redundant questions, where the key practice is already mentioned, or 
answers are covered by another questions. 
3 for practices that is not considered common in a municipality context.  
Only criteria with prioritisation score 1 are used in the creation of the new second 
questionnaire. 
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Figure 7 Example reversed GQM paradigm as a bottom-up approach 
As seen in the example above in for criteria 1.2.3, the key practice is found in the 
level 3 answer. The choice lead to give question 9 a prioritisation score of one, and 
we keep the filter question 8 since it is needed to sort out whether practice exists. 
We categorise two other questions as redundant, and to meet the completeness 
requirement we use question 52 to score levels 4-5. The full list of questions in the 
first questionnaire, the prioritisation score used in the analysis for the reverse 
GQM-process, and the selected criteria is found in Appendix 2 – Scope reduction 
and key practices analysis. 
Table 4 
Key practices found in the questionnaire with link to criteria 
Key Practices  Criteria Reference 
Has internal regulations (policy)  1.1.0  (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011; Krumay 
& Oetzel, 2011) 
Defined roles and responsibilities exist  1.1.2  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Regulations are reviewed to ensure that they 
comply with legislation 
 1.2.2  (Schroeder & Cohen, 2011) 
All processing activities are classified and 
have risk assessments 
 1.2.3  (Govender, 2015; Nuñez et al., 2016)  
Risk process exists and is used  1.2.4  (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 
2011; Schroeder & Cohen, 2011) 
Review agreements for personal information  1.2.5  (Kauffman et al., 2011; Schroeder & 
Cohen, 2011) 
Data protection impact assessments are 
performed 
 1.2.6  (Kauffman et al., 2011; Krumay & 
Oetzel, 2011) 
Incident process established  1.2.7  (Kauffman et al., 2011; Nuñez et al., 
2016; Schroeder & Cohen, 2011) 
Available resources among staff  1.2.8  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
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Formal requirements for internal staff are 
available 
 1.2.9  (Nuñez et al., 2016) 
Education in privacy takes place  1.2.10  (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 
2011; Schroeder & Cohen, 2011) 
Information to registered persons is done  2.2.1  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Document management plan exists and 
works 
 5.2.2  (Cavoukian, 2009) 
 
Process for registry extracts is available  6.2.1  (Nuñez et al., 2016) 
Identity verification process  6.2.2  (Nuñez et al., 2016) 
Process for personal data agreement   7.2.2  Requirement by the GDPR: 
(European Parliament, 2016) 
Has information security programs  8.2.1  (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 
2011) 
Information security is handled as a part of 
privacy 
 8.2.1  (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 
2011) 
External audits of information security take 
place 
 8.2.1  (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 
2011) 
Basic protection for logical access is 
available 
 8.2.2  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Protection for mobile devices is available  8.2.6  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Information security audits are performed 
and is defined 
 8.2.7  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Analysis of root cause  8.2.7  (Checkland, 1989; Kauffman et al., 
2011) 
Compliance Control defined  10.2.3  (Hertzberg, 2018) 
Deviation handling defined  10.2.4  (Kauffman et al., 2011) 
Monitoring effectiveness of controls   10.2.5  (Dennedy et al., 2014; Kauffman et 
al., 2011) 
 
A consequence of the reduction of criteria is that it is not possible to produce a 
report based on the ten grouping principles. Also, there can be missing measures 
for maturity. The measure of maturity is, after the reduction, not a complete 
assessment of privacy maturity, according to PMM. However, we find it not 
feasible to go along with the complete PMM and still be able to do a nation-wide 
survey. The aim of this thesis is for the results to be generalisable. Too low 
response rate impedes that. 
3.5 Creation of a new questionnaire and attributes 
The new second questionnaire is based on the reduced scope of the framework. The 
common denominator between the PMM and the Privacy maturity framework is 
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the criteria level. The new questionnaire consists of 23 of the total 73 criteria. The 
number of questions is a minimum of 30 and maximum 56 questions depending on 
how a respondent answer. Since it would not make sense to use the grouping of the 
principles, as mentioned above, we use another method.  
The grouping structure of GAPP has a legal perspective with the of the ten 
principles compiled of several legislations. There is a difference in whether to 
implement practises from a legal or a technical viewpoint. Adequate protection for 
privacy cannot be thought of only in terms of compliance with legal frameworks, 
but it also has technological and practical aspects (Rachovitsa, 2016). Instead of the 
legal perspective, the grouping is done with an IT-management perspective, from a 
practical point of view. We continued on the bottom-up analysis from the reversed 
GQM paradigm to select questions and criteria with key practices. Each criterion 
was examined and evaluated for similarities with each other. Here we have grouped 
the criteria in six attributes, where each attribute can be seen as a subject or 
managerial and practical aspects of process maturity, related to business problems 
rather than to regulations. See Figure 8. Wahlgren, Fedotova, Musaeva, and 
Kowalski (2016); Wahlgren and Kowalski (2016) conducted a similar approach of 
using attributes in the creation of a maturity model for measuring escalation 
capability of IT-related security incidents in Sweden. Nuñez et al. (2016) use 
attributes to group aspects of accountability.  
The six attributes are built from groups of criteria: 
1. Roles and responsibilities deal with management involvement, 
accountability and ownership; supporting resources; and ongoing 
monitoring. In this attribute one can determine whether management gives 
privacy issues sufficient resourses and mandate, excluding the Data 
Protection Officer. 
2. Governance and compliance are concerned with privacy policy; 
consistency of commitments; regulatory aspects and governance, 
compliance review; and noncompliance. This attribute is concerned with 
the existence of, how the process of rules is governed, how they are made 
purposeful and updated. 
3. Education and competence are addressing privacy education and 
awareness of employees; and establishes qualifications for personnel 
responsible for protecting personal data. 
4. Processes and tools cover communication to individuals such as provision 
of notice; automation; third party audits; data processing amendments; 
subject access requests; and retention of personal information. 
5. Risk and classification cover risk assessment; personal information 
identification and classification; and Data Protection Impact Assessments 
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(DPIA)5. This attribute is addressing the proactiveness of the organisation’s 
privacy processes to determine what to prioritise and which protective 
measures are appropriate for personal data.  
6. Incident and information security management is concerned with 
incident and breach management; Information security program; Logical 
Access Controls; Portable Media; and testing security safeguards. Security 
for privacy and especially information security can cover a lot more, but 
these are a selection, where the sheer existence of an information security 
program is covered and testing the efficiency of the program. The control of 
logical access to information is included as well, since this will uncover 
potential incidents. Unauthorised access accounts for 23 percent of the type 
of personal data breaches reported to the Swedish Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) (Datainspektionen, 2019a). Also, portable devises are in scope here, 
since lost devices (portable computers, tablets and mobile phones) are 
included in the cause behind 14 percent of the personal data breaches 
reported to the Swedish DPA (Datainspektionen, 2019a). 
 
Figure 8 Comparison between the PMM and the Privacy maturity framework. 
A comparison between the PMM and the Privacy maturity framework is in order. 
The former is comprehensive and include a lot more than needed in a municipal 
context. It would most likely also not be possible to use for a nation-wide survey of 
maturity, because attrition would make a lot of respondents drop out. The latter is 
more simplistic, and details are lost, but these details are outside the municipality 
context. Still, it is a framework to find out if key practices are present or not; and 
point towards a state of privacy practices maturity in a municipality context. If the 
                                                 
5 Konsekvensbedömning 
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PMM can be used to determine an exhaustive representation of privacy maturity 
generally, then the Privacy maturity framework can be used to exhibit a perception 
of privacy maturity and point in the right direction in a municipality context. 
In the new questionnaire, two questions are added as independent variables; (1) the 
size of the municipality; (2) and in which public sector area they represent. 
1. The size of the municipality used a simplification of the Swedish Association 
of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL) classification of municipalities (SKL, 
2017). It is the standard way to define municipalities in public statistics. 
However, the classification designates three groups of municipalities, including 
nine types. The classification includes five types of municipalities that not 
defined by size but instead defines them as a municipality with commuting 
distance from a city, medium-sized town or small town. We only used 
numerical values for both inhabitants in the municipality and inhabitants in the 
largest urban area6: 
- At least 200000 inhabitants and at least 200000 inhabitants in the urban centre  
- At least 50000 inhabitants and at least 40000 inhabitants in the urban centre  
- At least 15000 inhabitants and at least 15000 inhabitants in the urban centre 
- Less than 15000 inhabitants in the urban centre 
 
2. We have also added a multiple-choice question to determine in which public-
sector area the controllers work: In which public sector areas do you work? An 
analysis was done to determine if their area contains sensitive personal data. 
The result of the analysis is presented in Table 5. Some areas within a 
municipality contain a large number of sensitive personal data about citizens, 
for example social welfare and education (Integritetskommittén, 2016).  
 
We used two categories for the public-sector areas:  
- Sensitive personal data about citizens  
- Mostly non-sensitive data 
  
                                                 
6 We regard it would possibly be too complicated for the respondents to give a correct answer if we 
would use all nine types of municipalities. However, if we were to identity the municipalities 
instead of anonymous answers, this question would not be needed. Then again, without anonymity, 
we would perhaps not get true responses, since some questions could possibly be interpreted as 
breaking the law. 
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Table 5 
In which public sector areas do you work?  (Multiple-choice question) 
Response options Likeliness of sensitive personal data 
Management, law, finance, central service and 
administration 
Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Labour market issues Sensitive personal data about citizens 
Childcare and preschool activities Sensitive personal data about citizens 
Municipal company Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Culture and leisure Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Environmental and health protection Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Order and security Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Building and construction issues Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Cleaning and waste management Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Emergency services Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
City and environmental planning Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Social services Sensitive personal data about citizens 
Education for children and youth Sensitive personal data about citizens 
Water supply and drainage Mostly non-sensitive personal data 
Adult education Sensitive personal data about citizens 
Health care and care of the elderly and the 
disabled 
Sensitive personal data about citizens 
 
3.6 Pilot on the second questionnaire 
We performed a second pilot on the reduced questionnaire, where the number of 
questions was a minimum of 30 and maximum of 56. We extended the test into two 
groups. The first group was the same eight practitioners as in the first pilot from 
one municipality. In addition, we included seven Data protection officers (DPOs) 
from other municipalities and one DPO from a municipal company. The 
questionnaire was open for one week between April 23rd and 30th 2019. In total, 16 
testers yielded 11 completed survey responses. 
During a meeting, we held a feedback-session with the practitioners from one 
municipality. They gave a positive response in feedback to the second 
questionnaire and said it was easy to understand and answer the questions. The 
group of DPOs sent their input via e-mail and on comments in the survey. Our 
intention was not to use the framework for examining the maturity of the DPO, but 
rather their counterpart, the controllers. The questions are not formulated to address 
the DPO. There were some comments. One example of this is: “Based on the role 
of DPO, many of the questions are difficult to answer.”. The feedback from both 
groups group led to minor adjustments to the questionnaire. Questions were 
shortened further and simplified. 
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3.7 Analysis template 
We created an analysis template with the final scoring of the assessment questions. 
The complete set of questions and the analysis template is provided in Appendix 3 
– Questions, responses and analysis template. The template is used to score the 
answers into maturity ratings following the answers in a submitted questionnaire 
top-down. The score is rated on the criteria level. Initially, on each criterion, the 
value in the maturity column estimates a score from the selected answer. If a 
respondent has answered a follow-up question, the level can be raised further, as 
described below. A rating cannot be lowered. Each of the 23 GAPP-criteria in the 
framework has a representation of all levels 1–5, as described above. The scoring 
analysis template holds the documentation for all scores. The logic in the template 
includes one normal case and four special cases 
The way of scoring in the normal case: 
- One filter question contains a possibility to score levels 1-3  
- A follow up question contains a possibility to score level 4 
- A second follow-up question contains a possibility to score level 5 
 
See the example of the normal case in the 6.2.2 criterion above in Figure 6 
in the section Questionnaire construction.  
The way of scoring in four special cases: 
1. Redundancy cases. The case is that follow up questions are missing. Then 
either level 4 and 5 or only level 5 are scored on another question. This affects 
9 criteria. An example of this case is shown in Figure 7 above in the section 
Scope reduction. 
 
2. Multiple answers needed cases. This is the case in some follow-up questions 
for level 4 and 5, where the PMM required several practices in a level 
description. The answers in the follow-up question reflect this and is a multiple-
select. This affects 7 criteria.  
Question 27 is an example of Multiple answers needed (criterion 1.2.10 for 
rating levels 4-5): 
 
Question: Select the descriptions that best match the education program regarding data 
protection and privacy issues: 
 
Answers 
(multiple 
select): 
 E-training is used for new employees and at least annually for all 
employees. 
 The courses that the employees have undergone are documented and can 
occur in performance reviews 
 The education program is periodically evaluated to cover changes in 
regulations and legislation. 
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 A strong culture of data protection exists. When incidents occur, 
renewed training and information campaigns take place. 
 Other, please specify: ____________________________ 
 
In this case, both first and second answer are checked this scores level 4 and if 
also third and fourth answers are checked this scores level 5. The answer 
“Other, please specify:” does not affect the score. 
 
Another variant of Multiple answers needed is that two of three answers are 
needed, to get a level score or that all answers are needed to level score. This 
reflects that some level descriptions were similar in both the level 4 and 5 of the 
PMM. Then an answer could be interpreted as both 4 and 5. To solve this we 
added the scoring cases 2 of 3, 3 of 3 and 10 of 10, This affects 3 criteria. 
Question 32 is an example of the variant of Multiple answers needed (criterion 
5.2.2 for rating levels 4-5): 
Question: Choose from the descriptions about verifying the retention of personal data 
in a correct way:  
Answers 
(multiple 
select): 
 Verification that the retention is in accordance with the document 
management plan takes place automatically. 
 Personal data retention is regularly reviewed in a suitability assessment. 
 Changes or deviations are monitored, and the process is updated as a 
result. 
 Other, please specify: ____________________________ 
 
In this case, if 2 of 3 answers are checked these scores level 4 and if 3 of 3 
answers are checked these scores level 5. The answer “Other, please specify:” 
does not affect the score. 
3. All levels in one question cases. In two criteria either four (level 2-5) or all five 
levels (levels 1-5) are represented within one question. This is described above 
in Questionnaire construction regarding question 21 (criterion 1.2.8) and 29 
(Criterion 2.2.1). The latter is also an example of special case 2, Multiple 
answers needed. 
 
4. Control questions. There are two control questions which is not giving a score 
at all. Also, the first three questions (1-3) on independent variable do not rate 
score.  
The maturity level does not explain whether the municipalities are following legal 
requirements. If this was the case, possibly many respondents would not answer 
truthfully. No one wants to admit they are breaking the law. Even if a respondent 
answers negatively to a question or the actual process is, in reality, is non-existent. 
The lowest level is still level 1, ad hoc or at the starting point. One might argue 
that a “don’t know” answer is not valid for setting a maturity score of ad hoc, 
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because someone else in the same municipality has a piece of better knowledge. 
But then the potential practice cannot be common knowledge within that 
municipality and can then be interpreted as a sign of low maturity. Also, for 
reasons of completeness, all 23 criteria need a score. Otherwise, the comparison 
between categories would have different samples. The logical way is to purpose, if 
they don’t know, they are at the starting point, so then they get the lowest score. 
The consequences for some criteria not having "full" coverage in one single 
criterion for levels 4-5, is that the maturity assessments can differ from what the 
PMM has prescribed in the level descriptions. This, in turn, could suggest that the 
measuring of maturity is incomplete. However, the creation of the analysis 
template and scoring method in the special cases was interpreted with a lens of the 
general levels’ descriptions in GAPP and CMM, see Figure 1 framework CMM 1.1 
with five levels (Paulk et al., 1993) described in chapter 2, section 2.5 Maturity 
models. This included the detail estimation on responses available of how we could 
use a special case (or combination of cases) for scoring, if we consider the general 
description for levels 4-5.  
AICPA/CICA (2011b) describes the maturity levels 4 and 5 in general as: 
4. Managed – reviews are conducted to assess the effectiveness of the controls in 
place. 
5. Optimized – regular review and feedback are used to ensure continuous 
improvement towards optimization of the given process. 
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4 Application of the privacy maturity 
framework 
In the study, an inductive approach is used with a starting point in a search for a 
pattern or empirically based conclusions (Patel & Davidson, 2011). Our reasoning 
for studying municipalities’ privacy maturity with a framework, which is based on 
an adapted best-practice standard, is to be useful in a quantitative study for nation-
wide comparison and generalisation. The approach is open-ended, bottom-up and 
subjective, but at the same time descriptive and with an exploratory data analysis. 
We use both theory, research on the current state, prerequisites such as laws and 
standards involved; and data collection of empirical evidence in a search for new 
knowledge. Case studies and using semi-structured open-end questions could be 
useful for using an inductive approach, but they are prone to being ungeneralizable 
(Bryman, 2016). A statistics-based generalisation of the results is possible with a 
quantitative method (Patel & Davidson, 2011). Therefore, we use a quantitative 
survey using a questionnaire to the target population of municipal data protection 
controllers. 
4.1 Research context 
The units of interest for this study are the municipalities in Sweden. Data 
protection responsibility within the municipalities lies on the municipal councils as 
legal entities. In each municipality, there are several councils, in some large cities, 
even 10-50 councils. A council consists of politicians, but the concept of the 
controller encompasses, in reality, the organisation. For example, the social welfare 
board as a controller in a municipality includes administrative staff at the 
administration offices. Politicians might not have a detailed knowledge of the 
management processes required to answer the questionnaire. Consequently, there 
was a need to address the administrative staff at the administration offices that 
could answer for the account of the personal data controller. 
GDPR requires public authorities to designate a data protection officer (DPO) and 
report to the data protection authority (DPA) (European Parliament, 2016). The 
role of the DPO is to monitor the organisation’s compliance with the GDPR. The 
DPO is an independent function to audit, educate and advise controllers, similar to 
public auditors. However, the DPOs are not responsible for how controllers in 
municipalities are handling the issue of privacy management. DPOs regards 
controllers as the counterpart (Brezniceanu, 2017). A DPO can be an external part. 
Also, as a group of controllers from different public authorities can share one DPO. 
33 
The DPOs are not the target for the survey since DPOs do not possess detailed 
knowledge with the management practices of the controller. The controllers are the 
target of the study. 
4.2 Data collection 
Since the interest is in controllers, we contacted the Swedish DPA 
(Datainspektionen) and requested them to disclose the contact information, 
including names and e-mail addresses to the controllers within municipalities and 
their DPOs. Datainspektionen sent us a complete list, extracted on February 15th, 
2019, of all notifications of data protection officers from controllers in Sweden. 
The list we received was in printed format and contained controllers with their 
DPOs. After OCR-scanning and then filtering the respondent list based on e-mail 
address validation, the database consisted of a list of 1987 controllers in 
municipalities, which made out the respondents of the survey.  
The list of respondents contains some oddities that were not detected when the list 
was being processed. These problems were not discovered until after the invitations 
of the survey had been sent out. Since the list was expected to contain only the 
current DPOs and controllers, there was no suspicion of the existence of duplicates, 
which is the reason why no duplication check was performed. However, the list 
from Datainspektionen do not contain only the current registered DPOs and 
controllers, but also contact data for former DPOs. We identified 131 duplicates. 
We also noted that eight of the recipients are councils shared by a group of two to 
four municipalities, which is no result of an error, but it might be worth noting. 
In order to use the answer to a specific question for drawing general conclusions 
about the state in the population from which the sample is selected, a certain 
confidence level is needed. For example, a confidence level of 95 percent would 
mean that, if the survey would be repeated 100 times, it is expected that in 95 of the 
cases the unknown true value would be within the limits of the confidence interval. 
Also, in 5 of the cases, the true value would be expected not to be within the 
confidence interval (Körner, 1996). The confidence level and confidence interval 
are normally be calculated per variable after the completion of a survey. However, 
to get an idea of how many respondents would be needed in order to possibly 
obtain a specific confidence level, Cochran (1977) provides methods to calculate 
the needed sample size to reach the desired confidence level and a desired margin 
of error. As an example, to obtain a confidence level of 95 percent and a margin of 
error of 5 percent for a dichotomous variable and assuming the population to be 
1987 in total, a sample of 323 respondents is needed. However, taking into account 
the 131 duplicates and assuming the population to be 1856, the minimal number of 
respondents would instead be 319 respondents, which is only four respondents less. 
Consequently, this uncertainty of the exact population size will only to a limited 
extent change the number of respondents needed to have confidence in the results. 
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Finally, it is worth repeating that this calculations was done only to estimate the 
number of respondents needed, and that it was done for an example variable just to 
get an idea of the needed sample size and that each variable would have its own 
confidence level and margin of error, after the completion of the survey. 
4.3 Web survey 
The tool selected to collect the data is a web questionnaire tool. One of the reasons 
for the choice is the control it gives over the respondent’s flow through the survey 
(Persson et al., 2016). For example, the questions that do not apply to a respondent 
may be hidden with the usage of filter questions. That is, when a certain question is 
answered in a specific way it opens up for an additional question that is only 
relevant if the first question is answered in a specific way. Another reason for why 
a web tool it useful is the expected easiness in which it could export data directly in 
digital format which would facilitate further processing. 
Survey tools may offer a way to develop and maintain the questions within the 
survey platform. However, a decision was made to manage the questions and 
response alternatives outside the survey platform to gain control over the access to 
the material, which for instance, would facilitate the creation of question handouts 
to interested parties after the survey.  
4.4 Deploy survey 
The survey was conducted between May 2nd and 13th 2019. First, it was planned to 
be open for ten days. A reminder was sent out after five days. In order to make it 
possible for the respondents to have an extra chance to answer the survey after the 
weekend, the closure was postponed until May 13th, and a second message was sent 
out as a reminder.  
When the survey was deployed, a total of 1987 respondents were invited with an 
email containing a unique and individual link to the survey. A setting in the survey 
platform allowed us to not connect the respondents with the corresponding 
submitted answers, so the respondents are anonymous for us. The final number of 
submitted completed surveys is 454. Additionally, 274 respondents have completed 
a part of the survey. The response rate is 22,85 percent for the submitted surveys. 
With an actual number of 454 respondents, the earlier estimated minimum number 
of 323 respondents is reached with a margin of 131 respondents. 
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4.5 Analysis 
The survey tool provides functionality for exporting data files for both submitted 
survey forms and unsubmitted surveys. However, we decided not to use the data 
from the partly-answered surveys in the data analysis. Using not completed surveys 
will possibly create a low maturity on questions not answered and thereby 
contribute to a misleading result for these respondents and also would have an 
impact on the overall results of the survey.  
A small number of the 454 respondents that submitted the survey, skipped some 
questions. In total, out of the 52 questions used for calculating maturity, 20 
questions do not have any partial dropout at all. For the single selection questions, 
mostly rating levels 1-3, nine questions have 1 dropout, four questions have 2, 
eight questions have 4, two questions have 5, and 1 question have 8 dropouts. Six 
multiple-choice scoring mostly levels 4-5 questions have 5, 6, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
dropouts respectively. In total, we conclude that the partial dropouts are irregular 
and of a minimal amount, compared to the total answers. A common reason is that 
the respondent clicked on and missed the question (Persson et al., 2016). Given the 
fact that these respondents continued with the other questions and finally submitted 
the survey, it does not seem likely that the partial dropout was caused by attrition. 
We decided to interpret the non-responses as an irregularity and used imputation to 
substitute the value for the missing data (Little & Rubin, 1987). In the cases where 
this occurred for an initial filter question, the level is interpreted as level 1, ad hoc. 
A skipped question does not add to the possibility of advancing maturity. 
Therefore, a respondent does not gain any extra level but keep the achieved 
maturity level for a skipped question. 
After the closure of the survey, the data of the submitted surveys were exported 
from the online survey tool in a semi-colon separated text file. This data file was 
formatted with the questions in the first row as a header line, with the answers from 
one respondent per subsequent row. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) is a software tool to analyse statistical data. However, we estimated the 
amount of work was too high to get SPSS to calculate the maturity levels based on 
the answers from several questions. Instead, there was a need for either manual 
coding of the results into maturity levels or the use of a separate tool for the 
calculation of the maturity levels. Also, the complexity of the calculation of 
maturity levels based on the respondents’ alternative paths determined by their 
answers to filter questions and supplementary questions, required us to use a 
separate tool. 
Therefore, a Python script was developed for the purposes of calculating maturity 
levels and formatting the data to easier fit into SPSS. For example, to make the 
analysis tool accept multiple selection answers, the selected alternatives has to be 
extracted from one field and spread out to a separate field for every possible 
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alternative. The script works through the semicolon separated file, a row per row, 
as each row contained the answers of one respondent. For every criterion, the data 
fields containing the answers to the questions belonging to that criterion are 
analysed in order. For each question, the given answer is compared with the known 
set of alternatives and given a level according to the assessment rules of the 
framework. The level is then recorded by the script into a new variable containing 
the achieved level for that criterion. After the maturity of all criteria is calculated 
and stored in separate variables, one for each criterion, mean values for the 
attributes are calculated based on the criteria values of each attribute. Also, a mean 
value is calculated based on all criteria and stored in a separate variable. The script 
stores existing variables into a new semi-colon separated file, enriched with 
variables of calculated maturity levels. 
The work with the script was an iterative process. One of the authors took the role 
as a programmer and the other as a tester. The tester selected samples of the 
responses and then used the analysis template manually to score maturity7. 
Acceptance sampling was chosen randomly from the 454 submitted questionnaires. 
We then compared the results of the manual control with the results of the script. 
The programmer made corrections to the script into a new version. The work lasted 
several iterations, during which feedback was exchanged to improve the code. 
After the final iteration, the Python script contained around 1200 lines of code. 
After the pre-processing step, the data set contained maturity levels for all the 23 
criteria, mean values for the criteria within each of the attributes, a mean value for 
all criteria, as well as responses from the respondents. The data set was imported 
into SPSS, where the variables of the categorical level intended as independent 
variables within the data analysis were completed with labels. In SPSS it is 
possible to assign labels to the variable names and variable values in order to make 
the output from analysis more comprehensible. Variables treated like so are the 
grouping variables for municipality size, DPO/non-DPO and the variable for 
Category of sensitive data. 
Stevens (1946) presents four different scale levels of data: nominal, ordinal, 
interval and ratio, where a variable having a ratio scale permits the full set of 
statistical analysis methods while a variable with a nominal scale permits a 
minimal set of statistical methods. Kremelberg (2011) and other text books for 
statistic method might refer to nominal scale as categorical variables and interval or 
ratio as continuous variables. Variants of the nomenclature obviously also exist in 
statistical software as SPSS. 
The criteria variables have an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 with the corresponding 
names Initial, Repeatable, Defined, Managed and Optimized. In an ordinal scale, 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 3 – Questions, responses and analysis template 
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one value must be assigned to one category, but for a group of values, it makes 
sense to use means and variance to compare the result with other groups. Thus, a 
group value can be in-between two levels. A median value, which is the prescribed 
alternative to mean values for use with ordinal data, would not indicate a group of 
values being in-between. Stevens (1946) point out that in its strictest use, 
arithmetic calculations, such as means, variance and standard deviations should not 
be used based on ordinal data. Though, it is not forbidden and furthermore he states 
that “…On the other hand, for this ‘illegal’ statisticizing there can be invoked a 
kind of pragmatic sanction: In numerous instances it leads to fruitful results” 
(Stevens, 1946). Briand, Emam, and Morasca (1996) presents a pragmatic 
approach in the application of measurement theory, brought forward by the debate 
about the restrictive use of measurement theory after Stevens article (Briand et al., 
1996). For the past 30 years the use of mean-based statistics to categorize actual 
measurements in a useful way is not controversial, but rather a choice (Zumbo & 
Kroc, 2019). Consequently, a pragmatic approach towards the level of data was 
applied and mean values of the criteria variables’ values were calculated in 
accordance with that pragmatism. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA), is a statistical method that is using the means of a 
dependent variable to compare differences between two groups or more in an 
independent variable. It is used for finding out whether statistical significance 
exists in the differences between these groups. The independent variable, 
containing the groups is a categoric variable, while the depending variable is a 
continuous variable (Kremelberg, 2011). Gaito (1980) however, states that in 
contrary to what is suggested in many statistic text books, statistical procedures do 
not require specific scales in order to be used. He also explicitly points out that the 
assumptions of ANOVA don’t include assumptions about a specific scale and that 
the choice of scale has little impact on the significances found with ANOVA-tests. 
Norman (2010) also argues that ordinal scale variables could be used and that in 
fact, the risk of coming to a wrong conclusion is very small for robust parametric 
methods, such as ANOVA. Also, the robustness of ANOVA makes it forgiving 
regarding violations of assumptions about sample size, normal distribution. Briand 
et al. (1996) debate against a dogmatic selection of analysis methods based on 
variable scales. In fact, they indicate that measurement scales should not be used to 
proscribe statistical methods, but instead, common sense and a pragmatic approach 
should be used (Briand et al., 1996). Considering these arguments, ANOVA is 
estimated as suitable for analysing the differences between the grouping variables 
for municipality size, DPO/non-DPO and the variable for Category of sensitive 
data. In other word, three analyses are performed with ANOVA. In the first set of 
ANOVA-tests, attribute mean values are compared between multiple categories of 
municipalities with different sizes. In the second set of ANOVA-test each criterion 
is compared between the two groups of DPOs and non-DPOs. Finally, in the third 
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set of ANOVA-tests, each criterion is compared between the two groups of 
respondents from areas with high volume of sensitive data, and other respondents.  
When there are more than two groups in an ANOVA test, the test can only reveal 
significances in the general difference between the groups. An additional test is 
therefore needed to compare every group with all the other groups after the 
execution of the first test in order to find out whether there are significances 
between the specific groups. Such tests are called post hoc test, of which there are 
some to choose from. However, the Games-Howell test might be used even though 
the variances in the groups do not equal (Kremelberg, 2011). Consequently, 
Games-Howell post hoc tests were used for the comparison of maturity levels 
between categories of different sizes of municipalities. 
A specific notation is used to describe the results of an ANOVA test. An example 
of this notation might be: F(1, 452) = 5,177, p<0,05. In this notation, the “F” 
represents the F statistic or F-test, which is used in ANOVA to decide whether 
there is a significance in the results. Within parenthesis is the degrees of range, 
based on the number of compared groups and the sample size. Finally, the ”p” 
indicates the probability level of the found significance. (Kremelberg, 2011) 
Apart from the statistical analysis, extraction of descriptive statistics, such as 
confidence intervals, cross reference tables, and frequencies was also performed in 
SPSS. 
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5 Results of the survey 
In total 454 out of 1987 respondents completed and submitted the survey. The 
confidence level is at 95%. The response rate is 22,85 percent for the submitted 
surveys. The results are shown as tables and diagrams showing the criteria grouped 
into the six attributes. The diagrams are shown with the value of maturity based on 
the analysis. The aggregated general mean is 2,013 on a scale from 1 to 5. Almost 
at level 2 of maturity indicates that the controllers are in a defined and repeatable 
state. Routines and processes exist. However, these are not fully implemented. 
Most of the controllers score in the area round level 2 and only a few have reached 
above level 3, see Table 6 and Figure 9. Only two controllers are above level 4.  
Table 6 
Swedish municipal controllers in privacy maturity levels by criteria 
Controllers Number Percentage (n = 454) 
Below level 2 238 52% 
Between 2-3 198 44% 
Above level 3 18 4% 
 
 
Figure 9 Histogram with the number of controllers by maturity levels 
Breaking down the results, still on a general level, into the attribute-level and then 
the criteria level, reveals the maturity level for the six attributes and more detailed 
into each criterion. See the combined general results of the attributes and criteria in 
Table 7. and a comparison of how many controllers are rated at each maturity level, 
sorted by level 1 in Figure 10.  
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Table 7 
Privacy maturity in Swedish municipalities by attributes and by criteria 
    95% Confidence 
interval8 
Attributes and criteria (n = 454) Mean SD9 SE10 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Roles and responsibilities 1,993 0,670 0,031 1,932 2,055 
1.1.2 Responsibility and accountability for policies  2,256 0,801 0,038 2,182 2,329 
1.2.8 Supporting resources 2,441 1,252 0,059 2,325 2,556 
10.2.5 Ongoing monitoring  1,284 0,617 0,029 1,227 1,341 
Governance and compliance 1,920 0,627 0,029 1,862 1,978 
1.1.0 Privacy policies 2,782 0,958 0,045 2,694 2,870 
1.2.2 Consistency of privacy policies and procedures with 
laws and regulations 
1,795 1,005 0,047 1,702 1,888 
1.2.5 Consistency of commitments with privacy policies 
and procedures  
1,681 0,632 0,030 1,622 1,739 
10.2.3 Compliance review 1,632 0,994 0,047 1,540 1,724 
10.2.4 Instances of noncompliance  1,709 1,089 0,051 1,609 1,810 
Education and competence 1,796 0,776 0,036 1,725 1,868 
1.2.9 Qualifications of internal personnel  1,888 1,039 0,049 1,792 1,984 
1.2.10 Privacy awareness and training  1,705 0,936 0,044 1,619 1,791 
Processes and tools 2,378 0,671 0,032 2,316 2,440 
2.2.1 Provision of notice  2,119 0,709 0,033 2,054 2,184 
5.2.2 Retention of personal information  2,725 1,180 0,055 2,616 2,833 
6.2.1 Access by individuals to their personal information   2,304 1,218 0,057 2,192 2,416 
6.2.2 Confirmation of an Individual’s Identity 2,339 1,209 0,057 2,228 2,451 
7.2.2 Protection of personal information  2,403 1,193 0,056 2,293 2,513 
Risk and classification 1,941 0,711 0,033 1,875 2,006 
1.2.3 Personal information identification and classification  1,731 0,736 0,035 1,663 1,799 
1.2.4 Risk assessment 2,218 1,237 0,058 2,104 2,332 
1.2.6 Infrastructure and systems management  1,872 0,897 0,042 1,790 1,955 
Incident and information security management 1,881 0,543 0,025 1,831 1,932 
1.2.7 Privacy incident and breach management  2,110 0,986 0,046 2,019 2,201 
8.2.1 Information security program  2,531 0,893 0,042 2,448 2,613 
8.2.2 Logical access controls  1,535 0,750 0,035 1,466 1,604 
8.2.6 Personal information on portable media 1,872 1,082 0,051 1,772 1,972 
8.2.7 Testing Security Safeguards  1,359 0,833 0,039 1,282 1,436 
Average by criteria 2,013 0,491  0,023 1,967 2,058 
                                                 
8 A 95 % confidence that the true mean value for the population would be found within the interval 
spanning from the lower bound to the upper bound. 
9 Standard Deviation 
10 Standard Error is measuring the accuracy with which the sample represents the population. Here it 
is expressed as a decimal value, e.g. 0,023, but it can also be shown as a percentage, e.g. 2,3%. 
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Figure 10 Number of controllers by criteria and sorted by level 1 (n = 454).  
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Size of municipality is used for comparison between the different categories of 
municipality size. See the maturity result by size in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Privacy maturity in Swedish municipalities by size and attributes 
Attribute < 15000 11 15000-
49999 
12 
50000- 
199999 
13 
≥ 200000 
14 
Roles and responsibilities 1,869 2,024 2,151 2,032 
Governance and compliance 1,835 1,894 2,075 1,987 
Education and competence 1,699 1,790 1,967 1,758 
Processes and tools 2,141 2,500 2,728 2,090 
Risk and classification 1,772 1,989 2,116 2,065 
Incident and information security management 1,807 1,827 2,081 1,832 
 
Within the roles and responsibilities attribute, there is significance for a general 
difference in maturity between municipalities of different sizes, F(4, 448) = 3,234 , 
p < 0,05. And specifically, the large municipalities (50 000-199 000 inhabitants) 
have higher maturity than the smallest municipalities (< 15 000 inhabitants), p < 
0,01. 
Within the governance and compliance, there is also a significance in the difference 
generally between municipalities of different sizes, F(4, 448) = 2,655 , p < 0,05, 
and the large municipalities have higher maturity than the smallest, p < 0,05. 
Within the education and competence, there is no significance in maturity generally 
between the groups of municipalities of different size. However, the Games-
Howell post hoc test shows significance in the specific difference in maturity levels 
between large municipalities which have higher maturity levels than the smallest 
municipalities, p < 0,05. 
For the processes and classification attribute, the significance in the general 
difference in maturity between different municipality sizes is F(4, 448) = 17,599 , p 
<0,01. Here, the large municipalities have higher maturity levels than the smallest 
municipalities, p < 0,001, and also higher than the largest municipalities (≥200 000 
inhabitants) p < 0,05. Also, the small municipalities (15 000-49 999 inhabitants) 
have a higher maturity than the smallest, p < 0,001, as well as the largest, p < 
0,001. 
                                                 
11 Less than 15000 inhabitants in the urban center 
12 At least 15000 inhabitants and with at least 15000 inhabitants in the urban center 
13 At least 50000 inhabitants and with at least 40000 inhabitants in the urban center 
14 At least 200000 inhabitants and with at least 200000 inhabitants in the urban center 
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There is also a significance for the general difference between different 
municipality sizes within Risk and classification, F(4, 448) = 5,148 , p < 0,01. 
Also, there is a significance in that large municipalities have higher maturity than 
the smallest municipalities, p < 0,01. 
Finally, within the attribute Incident and information security management, there is 
a general difference in maturity levels between municipalities of different size, F(4, 
448) = 5,081, p < 0,01. And specifically, there is a significance in that large 
municipalities have a higher maturity level than the small, p < 0,01, and smallest 
municipalities, p < 0,01.  
Controllers working with sensitive data reveals the following: The category with 
controllers working with sensitive personal data answer they are more mature than 
the rest working with mostly non-sensitive personal data. The result of controllers 
grouped into the categories is shown in Table 9. A correlation is made between 
these two categories and various criteria and attributes to find significance with 
maturity levels. Results are presented within the six attributes in Figure 11.  
Table 9 
Controllers with sensitive data based on public service activity 
Category of sensitive data Controllers Percent (n=454) 
Sensitive personal data  161 35% 
Mostly non-sensitive personal data 293 65% 
Total  100% 
 
 
Figure 11 Comparison controllers with sensitive data and others by attribute. 
Data protection officers also answered the survey even though the survey was 
sent to controllers’ representatives and not to the DPO. The survey includes an 
obligatory question: Are you a Data protection officer? with just yes/no/other 
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response options. The results of both the No and the Other-option are grouped. 25 
percent answered Yes to the DPO-question, see Figure 12. Generally, a functional 
e-mail address within the administration of the municipality, is the address of the 
controllers. Some invitations must have been forwarded to the DPOs. This can be 
seen as a sign of low maturity. However, there is no maturity level based on the 
DPO-question in the survey. The question is intended for correlation, to find out if 
DPOs are estimating that their counterpart, the controllers, have higher or lower 
privacy maturity. 
 
Figure 12 Number of DPOs answering the survey. 
DPOs are rating the maturity lower on all attributes, except Education and 
competence. See  
Figure 13. One possible explanation to the higher rating in the Education and 
competence attribute is that the DPOs is responsible for privacy training. The 
differences shown on the attribute level are within the margin of error.  
  
Figure 13 Comparison with DPO and other respondents by attribute. 
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5.1 Roles and responsibilities 
Roles and responsibilities deal with management involvement, accountability and 
ownership; supporting resources; and ongoing monitoring. The average maturity in 
the attribute and the criteria within is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 Maturity levels of roles and responsibilities attribute and criteria. 
Responsibility and accountability for policies (criterion 1.1.2) point out if there is 
an appointed responsible and if this person has authority and recourses. 11 percent 
say they do not have a responsible person or group, except for the DPO; or they 
answer, “do not know” (Level 1); 59 percent have a responsible person or group, 
with limited resources and mandate. (level 2); 26 percent say that clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities exist and a documented process is used to evolve internal 
regulations (level 3); 0 percent furthermore periodically monitor the compliance 
(level 4); and top 4 percent above all else, also periodically assess the process to 
ensure continuous improvements (level 5). An ANOVA-test shows a significance 
between DPOs and non-DPOs in criterion 1.1.2 Responsibility and accountability 
for policies, F(1, 452) = 6,486, p<0,05 (Mean DPOs: 2,089, standard error: 0,076, 
Mean non-DPOs: 2,310, standard error: 0,043). DPOs rate the maturity lower than 
the rest of the respondents. 
Supporting resources (criterion 1.2.8) cover the topic of how resources are 
allocated by the management to implement and support the privacy policies of the 
organisation, except for the DPO. 35 percent of respondents claim resources are 
provided on an “as needed” basis to deal with privacy issues (level 1); 16 percent 
say resources are available, but the work is not supported by privacy specialists 
(level 2); 29 percent answer that resources are available and empowered with 
appropriate authority and funding (level 3); 16 percent claim management ensures 
that adequately qualified resources are available throughout the organisation for 
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different aspects of privacy (level 4); and finally 6 percent states that management 
performs yearly a review of the performance of resources (level 5).  
Ongoing monitoring (criteria 10.2.5) shows how the organisation is working on 
improving where necessary, related to an effective risk assessment and is also an 
accountability issue of taking long-term responsibility. 30 percent of the 
respondents answer that ongoing monitoring is informal, incomplete and 
inconsistently applied (level 1); 49 percent say they do not know (also level 1) 
which makes a total of 79 percent; 14 percent claims measuring is done, but does 
not cover all aspects (level 2); and 6 percent states they do have implemented 
documented process for monitored privacy controls, based on a risk assessment 
(level 3); 0 percent updates policies as a consequence of risk treatment, and 
perform both internal and external privacy risk reviews. (level 4); 0,4 percent 
additionally both has a formal evaluation of the efficiency of the risk process and 
has risk management adapted to various purposes. (level 5). 
5.2 Governance and compliance 
Governance and compliance are concerned with privacy policy; consistency of 
commitments; regulatory aspects and governance, compliance review; and 
noncompliance. The average maturity in the governance and compliance attribute 
and the criteria within is shown in Figure 15 
 
Figure 15 Maturity levels of governance and compliance attribute and criteria. 
Several questions cover privacy policies (criterion 1.1.0), and a key filter question 
is asking if there is an internal regulation covering integrity and data protection, 
like a privacy policy or other internal governing rules. 9 percent say they do not 
have an internal regulation covering integrity and data protection, or they do not 
know (Level 1); 30 percent answer they do have one partly. (level 2); 38 percent 
answer yes, they do have one (level 3); 21 percent also mark that all 10 GAPP 
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principles were included in the internal regulation (level 4), and 3 percent also 
periodically assess the policy creating process to ensure continuous improvement 
(level 5). The following significance was found: Controllers with sensitive data, 
estimated higher maturity than other respondents. F(1, 452) = 5,177, p<0,05. The 
mean of maturity of the sensitive data group was 2,919 standard error was 0,069 
while the mean of the others was 2.706 and standard error was 0,058. 
Consistency of privacy policies and procedures with laws and regulations (criterion 
1.2.2) is concerned with aspects of how comparison of internal regulation and the 
law is made. 52 percent say comparisons are done partly, but may be inconsistent, 
or do not know (level 1); 25 percent claim they do compare, but no documented 
guidance is provided (level 2); 20 percent answer a process has been implemented 
for regular law review and comparisons (level 3); 0 percent furthermore 
periodically monitor the compliance (level 4); and 4 percent also periodically 
assess the process to ensure continuous improvements (level 5). 
The consistency of commitments with privacy policies and procedures (criterion 
1.2.5) are covering review of agreements where data processing agreements are 
needed. 38 percent state that reviews of contracts for data processing agreements 
are incomplete, inconsistent or they do not know (level 1); 57 percent answer that a 
process exists to review contracts and other commitments (level 2); Only 4 percent 
say they have an established process covering all aspects and do reviews regularly 
(level 3); in addition, 0 percent periodically monitor the compliance (level 4); and 1 
percent also periodically assess the process to ensure continuous improvements 
(level 5). 
Compliance Review (criteria 10.2.3) is central for answering how an organisation 
works with compliance. How it is addressing long-term maturity and if 
commitments are managed systematically. 57 percent answer that compliance 
review is sporadic, informal or they do not know (level 1); 34 percent say 
compliance review is performed regularly but may not cover all aspects and are not 
fully documented (level 2); 9 percent have an established process covering all 
aspects and do reviews regularly (level 3). The follow-up question is used to set 
levels 4 and 5. It reached by only 0,9 percent of the respondents, and the responses 
to this question are also used for level 4 and 5 maturity ratings for several other 
questions. Of the total responses (n=454) 0 percent periodically monitor the 
compliance (level 4), and including all else, 6 percent also periodically assess the 
process to ensure continuous improvements (level 5). 
Instances of Noncompliance (criteria 10.2.4) deal with deviations of the privacy 
policies. 55 percent answer that handling of deviations is sporadic, informal or they 
do not know (level 1); 35 percent say handling of deviations is systematic and 
regularly occurring but may not be fully documented (level 2); Only 1 percent have 
an established process covering all aspects, all deviations are fully documented, 
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including disciplinary actions (level 3); 7 percent periodically assess the process to 
improve and avoid future instances of noncompliance partly (level 4); and 
moreover, 1 percent do this completely (level 5). 
On the questions 5,7 and 52 in the survey within the Governance and compliance 
attribute, there are also responses to open questions, which can be added to the 
attribute in a future version. The comments are in Swedish and here is a translation 
presented. Some examples from question 5 in criteria 1.1.0 for adding to the list of 
content of the privacy policy, which now is the list of GAPP-principles, are 
incident management; e-mail policy; procurement; protected identity; and DPIA. 
Question 7 is a follow-up question that is shown when someone has a no or do not 
know to the key filter question in 1.1.0. Here some reasons are given why there are 
no internal rules, and some example of responses: “We hired a person, starting in 
September to address this work”; “A management system is under construction.”; 
and “We don’t have our own rules, but are following the existing regulation”. From 
question 52, an example is “We follow up the previous work we did before the 
GDPR”. 
5.3 Education and competence 
The Education and competence attribute are addressing privacy education and 
awareness of employees; and establishes qualifications for personnel responsible 
for protecting personal data. The average maturity in the education and competence 
attribute and the criteria within is shown in Figure 16 
 
Figure 16 Maturity levels of education and competence attribute and criteria 
Qualifications of internal personnel (criterion 1.2.9) are covered in three questions. 
39 percent state there are no formal qualifications for personnel or they do not 
know (level 1); 51 percent say the organisation has some established qualifications 
for personnel but no documented guidelines (level 2); and 0,7 percent have formal 
requirements for personnel, have received appropriate training and have the 
necessary knowledge (level 3); 4 percent state there are specialists of privacy 
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among the internal personnel (level 4); and 6 percent are providing competence 
development  including privacy certifications (level 5). An interesting significance, 
F(1, 452) = 5,665, p<0,05, is found here, where controllers working in areas with 
sensitive data say they are more mature for the criteria (with a mean of 2,043; 
standard error of 0,090) than others within the total group of respondents (with a 
mean of 1,802; standard error of 0,057).  
Privacy Awareness and Training (criterion 1.2.10) deal with awareness and specific 
training for personnel in general and is covered in three questions. 54 percent state 
they have never had any privacy training, or they do not know if they had one 
(level 1); 29 percent say awareness campaigns are done, but sporadic, inconsistent 
and a training plan is missing (level 2); 14 percent claim a formal training plan 
exists, is consistent, and meets applicable laws (level 3). 2 percent say learning for 
new employees with yearly updates and training are used in performance reviews 
with employees (level 4); and 2 percent have a strong privacy culture and launch an 
awareness campaign with training after an incident; and training is periodically 
evaluated to cover changes in both internal regulations as well as legislation (level 
5). 
5.4 Processes and tools 
Processes and tools cover communication to individuals such as provision of 
notice; automation; third party audits; data processing amendments; subject access 
requests; and retention of personal information. The average maturity in the 
processes and tools attribute and the criteria within is shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17 Maturity levels of processes and tools attribute and criteria. 
Provision of notice (criterion 2.2.1) deals with how information about the 
processing of personal data is given to the individual by the organisation. 16 
percent answer the notice is not available, only given sporadic or they do not know 
(level 1); 60 percent say there is a general notice provided on the web or by another 
means (level 2); 22 percent also inform in a timely fashion for any changes or new 
2.378
2.119
2.725
2.304 2.339 2.403
1
2
3
4
5
Processes and tools
attribute (mean)
Provision of Notice Retention of Personal
Information
Access by Individuals to
Their Personal
Information
Confirmation of an 
Individual’s Identity 
Protection of Personal
Information
Ma
tu
rit
y l
ev
el
Processes and tools attribute and included criteria
50 
purposes (level 3); 2 percent furthermore trace the communication and know, at 
any given time, what information was given (level 4). On top of all other options, 1 
percent have integrated the information into services, in line with the Privacy by 
Design framework, and have an established process for improvements (level 5). 
Retention of personal information (criterion 5.2.2) reflects on how data is retained 
by the organisation, focussing on the use limitation principle in GDPR 
(European Parliament, 2016), requiring that data is not retained longer than 
necessary to fulfil the purposes unless a law or regulation specifically requires 
otherwise. In Swedish municipalities, a retention plan is referred to as a document 
management plan. 7 percent answer a valid document management plan is not 
available, is used sporadic or they do not know (level 1); 57 percent say a 
document management plan exists but is not entirely implemented (level 2); 4 
percent answer additionally that there is a document management plan that covers 
processes and routines and that it is in accordance with how it works in practice 
(level 3); 22 percent furthermore periodically review the plan and implement 
changes when needed (level 4); and 10 percent also have a verification process for 
retention periods, monitoring deviations and make suitability assessments (level 5). 
Within this criterion there is significance in the difference in the maturity levels 
between the respondents from areas with high volume of sensitive data with a mean 
of 2,882, a standard error of 0,094, and other respondents with a mean value of 
2,638, standard error of 0,068. F(1, 452) = 4,469, p<0,05. 
Access by individuals to their personal information (criterion 6.2.1) covers the 
management procedures for subject access requests, how they are handled as well 
as procedures for searching and gathering the personal data. 32 percent answer 
there is no specific procedure, it is sporadic, or they do not know (level 1); 34 
percent say there is a manual process, for example with a simple web form or 
document (level 2); 5 percent have a documented process covering all aspects of a 
subject access request, for example via a digital service (level 3); 26 percent 
furthermore report a process to search and compile personal data is implemented 
(level 4) 2 percent additionally deliver an automated self-service technical system 
handling subject access requests (level 5). 
Confirmation of an individual’s identity (criterion 6.2.3) focuses on how the 
organisation have designed procedures for verifying the identity of individuals 
sending in subject access requests. 28 percent answer the identification is informal, 
sporadic or they do not know (level 1); 35 percent claim a method is in place, but 
not wholly documented (level 2); 18 percent report they consistently use a secure 
identification process  (level 3); 11 percent of furthermore have traceability of the 
identification verification process (level 4); and on top 7 percent also monitor and 
periodically assess the process (level 5). 
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Protection of personal information (criterion 7.2.2) covers the combined topic of 
instructions (in the data processing agreement) to third-party and monitoring 
compliance with the instructions. 28 percent answer the handling is ad hoc, with no 
specific routines to evaluate the effectiveness of third-party controls to protect 
personal data, or they do not know (level 1); 30 percent say routines exist to ensure 
correct agreement with a reasonable assessment of the third-party protection, but 
processes are not fully implemented. (level 2); 19 percent say there is a 
documented process for managing the data processing agreement that includes 
specific instructions and requirements (level 3); 19 percent furthermore 
periodically monitor and assess the process (level 4); and, over and above, 4 
percent also monitor and evaluate the third-party environment to ensure continuous 
requirement compliance (level 5). There is significance in the results indicating that 
DPOs give answers that lead to lower maturity level compared to non-DPOs, of the 
criterion 7.2.2, Protection of personal information, F(1, 452) = 7,165, p<0,01. The 
mean of the DPOs is 2.143 and the standard error is 0,112, whereas the mean of the 
other group is 2.488 and standard error is 0,064. 
To the questions, 29,32 and 40 in the survey within the processes and tools 
attribute there are also responses as open questions, which can be added to the 
attribute in a future version. The comments are in Swedish and here is a translation 
presented. Some examples are on retention (5.2.2): “No regular control is done, but 
we actively handle deviations when they appear.” and “It is done when updating 
the archive, or when a co-worker have opinions on how it is done”. Both of these 
comments are reactive approaches. Also, on the concept of instructions (7.2.2) a 
DPO is commenting “The authorities usually send me, as a DPO, agreements. 
Intolerable! This is an area for improvement. The controller must create their own 
process for this”. Another typical comment is: “Data processing agreements are 
sent to concerned parties in time, but not everyone has signed them yet”. 
5.5 Risk and classification 
Risk and classification cover risk assessment; personal information identification 
and classification; and Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA). The average 
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maturity in the risk and classification attribute and the criteria within are shown in 
Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18 Maturity levels of risk and classification attribute and criteria. 
Personal information identification and classification (criterion 1.2.3) focus on 
management of classifying types of personal information and sensitive personal 
information at different levels of urgency. 41 percent have not classified the 
information, the classification is outdated, parts are missing or the do not know 
(Level 1); 48 percent say a basic classification is done, but with missing risk 
assessments (level 2); 11 percent report that all processing activities are classified, 
with risk assessments (level 3); 0 percent furthermore periodically monitor 
compliance, both internally and with third-parties (level 4); and top 1 percent above 
all else, also periodically assess the process to ensure continuous improvements 
(level 5). 
Risk assessment (criterion 1.2.4) covers the processes used to identify, assess, and 
respond to risks regarding personal data. 46 percent do not have a complete process 
for risk assessment regarding personal information handled by the organisation or 
the do not know (Level 1); 6 percent state they do have a risk process and that 
employees are generally aware of privacy risks (level 2); 33 percent report that a 
formal framework is used and documented, including risk identification, risk 
assessment and reporting (level 3); 12 percent also update policies as a 
consequence of risk treatment, and perform both internal and external privacy risk 
reviews. (level 4); 3 percent additionally say they have both a formal evaluation of 
the efficiency of the risk process and risk management adapted to various purposes 
(level 5). 
Infrastructure and systems management (criterion 1.2.6) deals with management of 
DPIA and potential privacy consequences when new or changed services are 
implemented. The DPIA is a special kind of risk assessment. Article 35 requires it 
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is compulsory to perform a DPIA if the processing may result in a high risk for the 
individual (European Parliament, 2016). 38 percent answer DPIA are performed 
sporadically for new business processes, new systems or they do not know (Level 
1); 48 percent preform DPIA for new systems or change to existing systems, but 
processes are informal and not fully documented  (level 2); 16 percent report that 
formal DPIAs are done in a process, covering both implementation or changes to 
products, services, businesses and infrastructure. (level 3); 0 percent furthermore 
periodically monitor the process, both internally and potentially with third-parties 
(level 4); and top 3 percent above all else, also periodically assess the process to 
ensure continuous improvements (level 5). A significance is found: Respondents 
working in areas with sensitive data has higher maturity levels for this criterion 
compared to all other respondents, F(1, 452) = 8,582, p<0,05. 2,037 is the mean 
maturity level of the sensitive data group (standard error is 0,070) while the mean 
of the complementary group is 1,782 with a standard error of 0,052. 
To the questions 11, 12 and 13 (all criterion 1.2.4) regarding risk assessment in the 
survey within the risk and classification attribute there is also a possibility to add 
comments and other descriptions, which can be included in future versions of this 
survey. The comments are in Swedish and here is a translation presented. 55 
comments come from question 11 How often do you use and update risk 
assessments? Here are some examples: “For all new processing, one DPIA is done 
according to GDPR, previously only for systems”; “A huge work is in progress to 
find the processing activities”; “This is being done in a project right now. When the 
project ends it will be handed over to operations.”; “not decided yet”; “it’s a future 
task together with the information management plan”; “ a work is being done to 
asses risks for the first time”; “We are just about to start using KLASSA15.” 
5.6 Incident and information security management 
Incident and information security management is mainly concerned with incident 
and breach management; information security program; logical access controls; 
portable media; and the testing of security safeguards. The average maturity in the 
                                                 
15 KLASSA is a web application to support Swedish municipalities and regions with information 
classification. https://klassa-info.skl.se 
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incident and information security management attribute and the criteria within is 
shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19 Maturity levels of the incident and information security management 
attribute and criteria. 
Privacy Incident and Breach Management (criterion 1.2.7) focus on the existence 
of incident and breach management routines and processes. 29 percent confirm 
routines exist to identify privacy incidents, but not fully documented, and 
management practices are ad hoc, or the answer is they do not know (Level 1); 42 
percent say a process has been developed on incidents, but not enough training has 
been provided (level 2); 24 percent report a process is implemented, including 
accountability, identification, risk assessment and response, containment, 
communications and monitoring (level 3); 1 percent furthermore is testing the 
breach management process (level 4); 5 percent say they also do both periodical 
and post-breach management assessment on the process to ensure improvements, 
and they have an Incident response team (IRT) ready to be summoned quickly 
(level 5). The following significance is found: Respondents within areas with 
sensitive data have higher maturity levels for this criterion compared to all other 
respondents, F(1, 452) = 9,233, p<0,05. The mean maturity level of the sensitive 
data group is 2,298 with a standard error of 0,087 and the mean maturity level of 
other respondents is 2,007 with a standard error of 0,053. 
Information Security Program (criterion 8.2.1) covers how security for privacy is 
related to the work on information security and whether a function exists and if it is 
evaluated. Here one could add a further deepening discourse with a systematic 
perspective on Information security with various approaches. However, it is out of 
scope for this thesis, due to limited time. 17 percent either relate to privacy as a 
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subtask of information security, they do not have a security function, unit or 
program working systematically or they do not know (Level 1); 21 percent say they 
partly have a security function, unit or program (level 2); 54 percent report that a 
security function, unit or program is in place working systematically with privacy-
related security, or they claim that work related to information security is part of 
the organisation-wide protection for privacy(level 3); 6 percent are additionally 
using external audits to review the program (level 4); and top 1 percent, also 
periodically assess the process to ensure continuous improvements (level 5). 
Logical Access Controls (criterion 8.2.2) deals with mechanisms to restrict access 
to information and control how privileges are used. 59 percent have either not been 
able to answer this, due to that they do not work systematically with information 
security, or they answer "do not know" (Level 1); 29 percent do one of two things, 
they review log files regularly for signs of intrusion or unauthorised access; or they 
have implemented technical systems for intrusion detection and monitoring (level 
2); 10 percent have both in level 2 (level 3); 0 percent furthermore periodically 
monitor compliance, both internally and with third-parties (level 4); and top 0,9 
percent also periodically assess the process to ensure continuous improvements 
(level 5). Within the criterion Logical Access Controls, there is a significance in the 
difference in maturity level between respondents from the areas with high sensitive 
data in contrast to the rest of the respondents, F(1, 452) = 14,638, p<0,01. The 
sensitive data group has a mean of 1,714 with a standard error of 0,067, whereas 
the group with the rest of the respondents has a mean of 1,437 with a standard error 
of 0,039. The mean of all the respondents is 1,535 with a standard error of 0,035. 
Personal Information on Portable Media (criterion 8.2.6) reflects on how the 
organisation is managing protection for data on portable media or devices from 
unauthorised access. 46 percent say routines and processes for management 
protection of portable devices are missing or inconsistent, or they “do not know“ 
(Level 1); 36 percent have a basic but limited protection and may have technical 
safeguards implemented, for example mobile devise management. (level 2); 7 
percent report that processes, routines and protection for portable devises are in 
place, including monitoring, testing and reviews (level 3); 6 percent additionally 
require an acknowledgement of responsibilities before a devise is issued to an 
employee, or there is a protection mechanism (encryption) for devices during 
transfer and physical transport (level 4); and 4 percent have both and are 
continuously implementing improvements (level 5). 
Testing Security Safeguards (criterion 8.2.7) covers the overall testing of efficiency 
of organisational, technical and physical security. 77 percent say tests are sporadic 
and inconsistent, or they answer, “do not know” (Level 1); 17 percent have a 
regular tests of security safeguards of different functions, with varied scope. (level 
2); 2 percent say tests of security safeguards in all significant areas are done yearly, 
documented by qualified personnel (level 3); 0,9 percent partly analyse test to find 
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root cause to improve the overall security of the organisation  (level 4); and 3 
percent are either doing full root cause analysis to improve the overall security of 
the organisation, or make  periodical assessments for the process to ensure 
continuous improvements (level 5). 
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6 Discussion 
In this chapter, we further analyse the findings on the state of privacy maturity in 
Swedish municipalities. First, we present some general significances on the results. 
Second, we discuss the findings on the different attributes and included criteria in 
six sections. We sum up the discussion with reflections on the municipal 
controllers' inclination to perform visible practices and neglecting other privacy 
matters. Third, we suggest topics for further research. Fourth, we consider practical 
implications. The chapter ends with some self-critically discussions on the 
limitations of the study. 
6.1 Privacy maturity in Swedish municipalities 
We found a significance by the size of the municipality and the different attributes, 
especially the process and tools attribute. The medium-large municipalities scores 
higher in average to other groups, both smaller and larger, see Table 8. Perhaps, 
theory on organisational innovation and potential determinants could be used to 
explain, such as specialisation, functional differentiation, professionalism, 
centralisation, managerial attitude toward change, technical knowledge resources, 
administrative intensity, slack resources, and external and internal communication 
(Damanpour, 1991). Too small municipalities lack resources for specialisation and 
professionalisation, and the large cities are too centralised, formalised and hindered 
by vertical differentiation. This size-related topic is an area for further research. 
In the survey, there were several instances of significance between the group 
working in areas with the likeliness of large quantities of sensitive personal data 
having higher maturity scores, than others. A possible explanation for this is that 
already existing rules and processes are being used, which is not a far-reaching 
conclusion, e.g. in the student health in schools. Likewise, practitioners in social-
work also work with sensitive information and have a long tradition of working 
with confidentiality and ethical issues (Millstein, 2000). Unfortunately, some areas 
pose significant risks. The municipal healthcare system has extensive regulations 
regarding how sensitive information should be handled, but at the same time, they 
have several actors nationally, regionally and locally. Lots of risks have been 
identified due to shortcomings in management, compliance, coordination, 
complexity, interoperability, information security, information sharing; and there is 
a severe risk with spreading personal information. (Integritetskommittén, 2016). 
DPOs are rating the maturity lower than the rest. The differences are not proven 
statistically significant in the attributes, but there is still an indication of a possible 
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difference. Since the role of the DPO is new, specific theories have not been found 
in the literature to explain this. One possible way to explain is that the DPO is 
supposed to criticise and be realistic. The DPO-role is required to be independent, 
and DPOs must show firmness towards the controller and not be obedient 
(Brezniceanu, 2017).  With this line of thinking, more research would be needed 
into the role of the DPO. Not only that, the legal requirement for public authorities 
is only a year old yet. Much more can be learned about the view of privacy of 
DPOs and their counterparts, the controllers, by investigating further. 
6.1.1 Roles and responsibilities 
For the organisation of privacy work in municipalities, the results show that less 
than a third of the controllers have defined roles and responsibilities, except for the 
Data Protection Officers (level 3, criterion 1.1.2). Among the DPOs, the rating is 
even lower for the criterion 1.1.2. This low rating indicates that understanding the 
role of the DPO as an independent auditor is perhaps not understood, or prioritised, 
by the leaders. Perhaps the municipalities leaders think it is enough to have a DPO. 
Even though roles and responsibilities are not defined, about half of the controller’s 
state that there are resources available empowered with appropriate authority and 
funding (level 3, criterion 1.2.8). Monitoring of the effectiveness of controls for 
long-term responsibility and accountability is almost neglected completely. Only a 
few are addressing the responsibility to implement a documented process for 
monitored privacy controls, based on a risk assessment (level 3, criterion 10.2.5). 
The low maturity regarding roles and responsibilities could also be seen as a 
confirmation of the survey by the Swedish DPA that management in municipalities 
is less aware of privacy and is not giving this a priority, compared with other 
sectors. (Datainspektionen, 2019b).  
6.1.2 Governance and compliance 
The point of departure for a systematic approach to govern privacy in an 
organisation is the existence of an internal regulation – a privacy policy 
(Densmore, 2016). A majority of the municipal controllers state they do have 
internal regulation covering privacy and data protection (level 3 and above, 
criterion 1.1.0). An internal privacy policy’s function is to govern the organisation 
and can be treated as a checklist for legal compliance (Krumay & Oetzel, 2011). It 
will be difficult to show evidence to the regulator of how the laws are implemented 
for self-regulatory accountability if there is no internal policy or governance 
framework (Bennett & Raab, 2018).  
Only a quarter of the controllers in municipalities say regulations are reviewed to 
ensure that they are consistent with legislation (level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.2). 
However, very few checks that their commitments are consistent with these 
regulations. Only 5 percent state they have a process in place covering all aspects 
to review contracts and other commitments (level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.5). The 
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two consistency criteria (1.2.2 and 1.2.4) together with the risk assessment criterion 
1.2.4 (discussed below), are essential for the process of creating a scalable risk 
management framework in an organisation, according to Schroeder and Cohen 
(2011).  
Very few controllers state they have defined compliance controls, only one in ten, 
to review that compliance is performed regularly covering all aspects and are fully 
documented (level 3 and above, criterion 10.2.3). A compliance review is one of 
the tasks of the DPO but could also be done by an internal audit function 
(Hertzberg, 2018). Also, very few claims having a documented process for 
noncompliance deviations, including disciplinary actions, covering all aspects 
(level 3 and above, criterion 10.2.4). If processes for reviewing compliance do not 
exist, there is no way of proving the policies are used purposefully. 
6.1.3 Education and competence 
The awareness cannot be sufficient since half of the controllers in municipalities 
say they never performed any training in privacy. Some controllers have had some 
training, bot sporadic, most likely during the GDPR implementation projects. 
However, only a fifth say they do have a consistent formal training plan, or 
awareness program, and do regular training for internal personnel, in general as 
well as for persons working directly with privacy (level 3 and above, criterion 
1.2.10). This division indicates that some become more aware of privacy, while 
others do not know much. Adequate and efficient training is necessary to create 
and improve user awareness and behaviour, and even though the topic of privacy 
and security seem boring to some people, motivation can be raised with training in 
small groups on an individual level, and with an increased organisational 
knowledge as a result (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010). 
Regarding formal requirements for internal personnel working with sensitive 
information, only one in ten say they have reached the level of doing appropriate 
training and with the necessary knowledge, (level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.9) but 
half of the controllers show at least some requirements (level 2, criterion 1.2.9). 
This criterion also uncovers the existence of privacy specialists, except for the 
DPO, but a scarce one. There is a significance for persons working with sensitive 
information to show higher maturity. This reality is not surprising since laws are 
requiring particular qualifications for persons working in specific jobs within 
municipalities. For example, when applying for a job working with children, an 
applicant needs to show a police record of his or her criminal history. Also, within 
healthcare and social services, there are a lot of sensitive data, but regulations and 
practices exist and apply (Integritetskommittén, 2016). 
6.1.4 Processes and tools 
Most controllers show the provision of notice as a web page and refer to this page 
when communicating to individuals. The existence of public notice (some prefer to 
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call this the policy) is crucial and one of the first steps an organisation can do to 
show the public how they are complying with the GDPR privacy requirements. To 
be mature, it is not enough to have a notice on a web page, but also to inform in a 
timely fashion for any changes or new purposes (level 3 and above, criterion 2.2.1). 
To publicly explain how an individual's personal information is collected, stored, 
used, retained and shared is one thing that can be done to gain trust. Proper 
communication with individuals is a display of the organisation's transparency and 
should meet the expectations from individuals to avoid adverse consequences 
(Karwatzki et al., 2017), even for subjective harm (Calo, 2011). 
Almost all controllers in municipalities say they have a document management 
plan in place (level 2 and above, criterion 5.2.2) and about two of five say it is 
accurate with how it works in practice (level 3 and above, criterion 5.2.2). For 
municipalities, the existence of laws for how authorities should retain information 
is not a new thing.  
Another visible area is how the municipalities are dealing with the right to subject 
access requests (SAR) to individuals. GDPR requires that a registered receives an 
extract of the records in one month, under normal circumstances. To see how 
municipalities addresses this is very interesting. There are two strategies revealed 
in the results – one ambitious and one cautious. The ambitious strategy aims for a 
digital solution of at least the requesting of a SAR and the identification. One third 
claim to have a documented process covering all aspects of a subject access 
request, and using, for example, a digital service (level 3 and above, criterion 6.2.1) 
and also, one third consistently use a secure identification process, via for example 
a digital citizen identification solution, such as BankID (level 3 and above, 
criterion 6.2.2). The other strategy is cautious and not investing in automation and 
are instead using no specific method or using a standard form for the request 
process (level 2 and below, criterion 6.2.1) and a manual method for verification of 
identity (level 2 and below, criterion 6.2.2). Likely, considerable investments have 
been made by the ones with the ambitious strategy. This effort is also a display of 
trying to meet the expectations of the individuals, regarding transparency.  
Another area where efforts have been made is to create processes for handling 
personal data agreement with third-parties and make assessments of third-parties. 
To have a personal data agreement is a requirement by the GDPR (European 
Parliament, 2016). Two of five have a documented process for managing the data 
processing agreement that includes specific instructions and requirements (level 3 
and above, criterion 7.2.2). DPO rates the maturity significantly lower for criterion 
7.2.2. One assumption is that many DPOs have been responsible for not only 
review but also to produce the agreements. Some evidence for this is found in the 
comments of the results. Third-parties are often cloud providers, and the use of 
cloud services lead to a loss of transparency and control, which are areas of serious 
privacy risk due to incorrect assumptions about the service provider's security 
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activities, according to Integritetskommittén (2016). External parties can handle 
sensitive personal data and municipalities often have deficiencies in competence 
for assessing this accurately (see criterion 1.2.9) above under Education and 
competence. 
6.1.5 Risk and classification 
Half of the controllers say they have a formal risk framework that is used, at least 
once a year, with documented, including risk identification, risk assessment and 
reporting (level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.4), but only one in eight have classified 
the processing activities, with risk assessments (level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.3). 
A particular form of risk analysis is the Data Protection Impact Assessments 
(DPIA), required by the GDPR when there is high risk for individuals (European 
Parliament, 2016). One-fifth of the controllers in municipalities claim they use 
formal DPIAs in a process, covering both implementation or changes to products, 
services, businesses and infrastructure level 3 and above, criterion 1.2.6).  
A lot of different comments were added by controllers in the results, showing an 
awakening in the use of risk assessments, DPIAs and classification. An assumption 
is that a lot is going on at the moment. Risk assessments are the foundation for 
addressing privacy management and measure proactiveness of the organisation’s 
privacy processes to determine what to prioritise and which protective measures are 
appropriate (Govender, 2015; Kauffman et al., 2011; Schroeder & Cohen, 2011). 
The question that follows is how much should a controller invest in mitigating risks 
in security and privacy protection. Kauffman et al. (2011) suggest and refer a 
stream of value-at-risk theory from financial economics, to use as an approach for 
investing in privacy protection, based on risk estimations, to find suitable 
thresholds, similar to stop-loss mechanisms. There should be an interval of a best 
and a worst possible consequence if risks are realised. This reasoning is consistent 
with the idea of a balance between how-to comply both with regulations and 
maximises at the same time business priorities (Bélanger & Crossler, 2011). 
6.1.6 Incident and information security management 
Almost a third of the controllers are prepared for potential breaches and have a 
comprehensive personal data breach process established (level 3 and above, 
criterion 1.2.7). So, the rest claim routines exist, but they lack training, or it is not 
documented. Also, controllers working with sensitive data claim they have a higher 
maturity. Only one in ten of controllers say they have basic protection for logical 
access available, where they review log files for signs of intrusion or unauthorised 
access; and have implemented technical systems for intrusion detection and 
monitoring (level 3 and above, criterion 8.2.2). One in six, claim they have 
adequate protection for mobile devices available (level 3 and above, criterion 8.2.6) 
and a quarter claim that limited information security audits are done (level 2 and 
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above, criterion 8.2.7) and only a few actually say they have defined processes for 
this practised on regular basis (level 3 and above, criterion 8.2.7). 
The requirement from the law is that controllers must report within 72 hours to the 
Swedish DPA if a personal data breach occurs if there will include risk for 
individuals (European Parliament, 2016). Breaches reported from the start of 
GDPR, from May 25th, 2018 and until April 2019 to the Swedish DPA consisted 
of a majority of incidents, where emails were sent to wrong recipients and errors by 
granting access to wrong persons. Both these types of error can be seen as minor 
issues, with possible limited consequences for registered individuals; this could be 
a sign of over-reporting to the DPA. However, since maturity of many controllers’ 
knowledge of third-parties security practises are low (criterion 7.2.2); classification 
with risks assessments are only done by a few (criterion 1.2.3); and only a few have 
necessary protection for logical access (criterion 8.2.2): extremely few are testing 
security in a comprehensive regularly way (criterion 8.2.7); this could also be a 
sign of controllers not knowing of incidents, and there may be under-reporting on 
incidents where there are severe consequences for individuals. Controllers may 
simply do not know whether they had a breach. 
Two-thirds of the controllers in municipalities have an information security 
program or a person responsible for information security, or they claim the 
information security is part of the privacy protection function (8.2.1). This lack of 
security function is similar to the study from MSB in 2015; 2 of 5 of the 
municipalities did not have a responsible person for information security (MSB, 
2015, 2016). To consider information security as a part of privacy is by PMM 
regarded as a mature practice (AICPA/CICA, 2011b). Security is more visible than 
privacy (Krumay & Oetzel, 2011), but privacy is also broader than security 
covering aspects of, e.g. transparency and lawfulness. Many of the activities 
suggested in Solove (2008) that many privacy invasive actions like for example 
interrogation, surveillance, secondary use, exclusion, explosion are not issues that 
can be solved by improved technical controls. These are not information security 
issues. We infer that sorting privacy practices in a municipality under an IT-
security umbrella is an immature practice since a lot of essential aspects of privacy 
cannot be addressed purely from an IT-perspective. Still, we see examples of this in 
the results. 
6.2 Transparency is prioritised, risks are neglected 
The CMM defines mature and immature organisations, stating the former are more 
proactive than the latter (Paulk et al., 1993). Where should the limit be drawn of 
what maturity is enough? This boundary is a question, which must be answered by 
each organisation. With the results at hand, one could suggest that the state of 
privacy maturity uncovered for Swedish municipals is not a satisfying one, and 
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there is room for improvement. Especially on the protection and meeting risks that 
are less visible.  
Privacy risks are emerging with the rise of new technologies and are putting 
pressure to meet the individual’s concern for adverse consequences (Karwatzki et 
al., 2017). Laws have been created to answer the individual’s concerns of privacy. 
Laws, which are instruments for policy (Bennett & Raab, 2018). The results in this 
survey reveal significant problems in municipalities with having working processes 
to meet the regulations. If laws are not obeyed this will indirectly affect the 
individual’s concerns of privacy in the chain of  “technologies–policies–processes–
people–society–economy–legislature” (Lowry et al., 2017). Technology, by itself, 
is not offensive (Nissenbaum, 2004). It depends on the norms and the expectations 
of the individual in the current context. One clear line is that municipalities have 
prioritised concerns of transparency, which are needed to avoid negative 
perception, as stated by (Calo, 2011). The results show more effort is put into 
visible artefacts, like information and privacy notices and handling subject access 
requests. However, the other parts of privacy practices are less visible to persons 
outside the organisation – if nothing happens. When a breach occurs, or an 
inspection by the Swedish DPA, deficiencies in practices will become a focal point 
if neglected. How much a bad privacy practice becoming visible will affect the 
trust of the organisation, depends on where, when and how it occurs. A suggestion 
for a sufficient level of privacy maturity would be to be able to avoid and handle 
the consequences of all privacy risks, even the less visible.   
6.3 Future research 
Further research could also be done by applying the privacy maturity framework in 
other areas. For example, cross-national, public companies, regions, government 
authorities, non-governmental organisations or the private sector. The questions 
need to be adjusted in some cases, but also a slightly different set of criteria could 
be included, which would, of course, make comparisons harder. Some of the added 
criteria could be used without modification, and this would then be the common 
ground for comparison. There are also some notes in some areas for research in the 
conclusion below. 
6.4 Practical implications 
Here is a practical use to benchmark for practitioners who participated in the 
survey. When the questionnaire was completed, there was a possibility given to 
download the answers. There are two options to find out the score. One is to use 
the analysis model in Appendix 3 – Questions, responses and analysis template to 
set a maturity score manually. The other is to send the time-stamp on when the 
survey was submitted, which can be found on the PDF with the answers. We can 
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then reply with the maturity score on the attributes and the criteria. The email 
address to use for this is gusbroma@student.gu.se. 
6.5 Limitations of the study  
Below are some reflections and limitations of the Privacy maturity framework, an 
evaluation of the work, possible effects on the result and potential improvement 
possibilities. 
The privacy maturity framework is created with a starting point in the PMM to be 
used in a quantitative study. The use of a maturity model is too simplistic for 
making predictions, according to King and Kraemer (1984). However, we are not 
prescribing, but rather comparing the municipal entities on a national level. For 
comparisons and benchmark, the privacy maturity framework can be useful, since a 
maturity score gained by answering the questionnaire now has a baseline for 
comparison. A controller can compare its own scores with the national levels. Also, 
a comparison can be made at a later time to reflect on changes. 
The risk assessment criteria cover five questions due to the importance of using a 
risk-based approach to privacy management. It was not possible to change this after 
sending the questions. The same goes for some criteria, which were only covered 
by one question. If done again, another method of rating would have been used for 
some of the criteria. However, the results would not be comparable with the results 
of this survey.  
The concept of consent was left out from the survey since municipalities have few 
processing activities based on consent. If comparisons to other areas were to be 
done, consent would probably need to be addressed. Westin (1967) argues that 
individuals are to determine for themselves about when they choose to participate 
or not in an activity and to choose anonymity. This determination refers to give a 
choice to the individual via consent and has been included in GDPR if no other 
legal grounds are possible. The legal requirements for consent require defined 
processes, and it would be interesting to research further into this area.   
If one were to redo the survey, one way would be to standardise the questionnaire 
further to handle the level 4-5 scoring. We would also use another way to calculate 
the highest levels for several questions, to keep the integrity of each criterion as a 
requirement and to set all levels without referring to another question. The 
disadvantage in the current survey is that a few respondents may have been given 
lower maturity score on some questions, since they might have failed to answer the 
filter question response 3 in question 51 and missed the level 4-5 question 52. 
The criterion 8.2.7, Testing Security Safeguards, received very low maturity rating. 
A few respondents gave comments on this, stating that it would be insecure to give 
away such information, so they refused to answer. However, all the answers were 
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anonymous. It is not known whether this has affected the results on this criterion. 
Still, the results of this criterion should be considered with this in mind.  
Privacy by design is not covered in the survey. PbD, is a set of principles on how to 
design privacy into services (Cavoukian, 2009). Still, PbD is a legal requirement. 
The application of PbD principles would automate much information and also 
retention (with automatic archiving and deletion), leading to a whole set of possible 
descriptive aspect to include in future maturity studies. 
The framework to measure privacy maturity have limitations in conception. 
Conceptually, one can ask: Can privacy maturity be determined by asking 
questions in a web survey? It is a challenge to conduct a study on an organisational 
level for privacy practices with data collection techniques such as online surveys 
(Smith et al., 2011). We agree to this finding and infer that, for using a full PMM-
scope, it would be tough to uncover with the online survey data collection method. 
A more qualitative method should be used to get closer to reality since attrition 
would make the respondent unwilling to answer a more comprehensive 
questionnaire and likely drop-out of the survey. Perhaps a possible approach would 
be to the use of the full GAPP framework and the PMM in a series of either focus 
group or in-depth interviews workshops. These workshops or interviews would 
take considerably more time, and a comparison would be tough to generalise on a 
nation-wide level. However, it would provide a deeper understanding of the 
privacy maturity, specific challenges and suggestions for improvements.  
Additionally, respondents understand concepts and questions differently. 
Therefore, answers and maturity must be seen in the context of diverse knowledge, 
experience, available time, willingness to participate and other possible limitations. 
The answers are no absolute truths. What is interesting is the comparison within the 
group of Swedish municipalities. Also, does the framework represent the real 
processes? Uncertainties can arise because both parameters in the framework and 
that calculations are empirically determined and represent multiple processes.  
Lastly, this survey may affect the respondents to improve their processes. When 
doing the study, several mails were received where respondents wanted to use the 
questionnaire as a basis of discussion. There might be a chance that the survey has 
affected the respondents to improve their privacy management processes. 
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7 Conclusion 
We have conducted a survey on the municipalities of Sweden with a quantitative 
approach using framework for measuring privacy maturity. Through an iterative 
process, we created a Privacy Maturity framework, which consists of 56 questions 
and is supported by 23 criteria of the GAPP best-practice standard. The approach is 
to make an inductive and systematic attempt to measure descriptive and 
comparative maturity in municipalities. A web-survey on 454 municipal controllers 
in Sweden reveals significant challenges. The level of maturity of Swedish 
municipals is around two on average on a scale of 1-5. It is not satisfying.  
In the results, there are several significant patterns, and there are four most striking 
findings of the survey: 
First, controllers in medium-large municipalities are estimating maturity higher 
than others. An explanation may be that small municipalities lack resources, and 
the large cities are too complicated. More research is needed in this area. 
Second, less than a third have defined roles and responsibilities for privacy, 
excluding the DPO. Privacy is perhaps not understood, or prioritised, by leaders in 
municipalities. DPOs are estimating maturity lower than others. The role of the 
DPO is an exciting research topic. 
Third, there may be under-reporting on incidents and breaches where there are 
severe consequences for individuals, due to lack of protection, monitoring and 
testing of safeguards, lack of checks of third-party security practices and treating 
privacy topics as IT-security problems. Controllers working with a lot of sensitive 
data are rating maturity higher in these areas. Why this area is under-prioritised is 
interesting for further studies. 
Last, municipalities have prioritised concerns of transparency and communication. 
Visible processes like communication of privacy notice, meeting requests from 
registered, and retention practices are the areas with the highest estimated maturity. 
There are two strategies found – one ambitious and one cautious. The ambitious 
strategy puts effort into the use of digital services, and the cautious have more or 
less informal manual practices. Why some are cautious and what motivates the 
organisations that are ambitious is a topic for further research.   
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Appendix 1 - GAPP principles and criteria 
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GAPP Principles, aspects and criteria headers in English (AICPA/CICA, 2011a) and Swedish 
translation. 
Pr
in
ci
pl
e 
A
sp
ec
t 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
English description Swedish description 
1.0  
 
Management Styrning och förvaltning 
 1.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  1.1.0 Privacy policies Intern personuppgiftspolicy 
  1.1.1 Communication to internal personnel Intern kommunikation 
  1.1.2 Responsibility and accountability for 
policies 
Ansvar och skyldigheter 
 1.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  1.2.1 Review and approval Granskning och godkännande 
  1.2.2 Consistency of privacy policies and 
procedures with laws and regulations 
Följdriktighet av policy och riktlinjer 
med lagstiftning  
  1.2.3 Personal information identification and 
classification  
Klassning av personuppgifter  
  1.2.4 Risk assessment Riskbedömningar 
  1.2.5 Consistency of commitments with 
privacy policies and procedures 
Granskning av följdriktighet av 
åtaganden med policy och riktlinjer 
  1.2.6 Infrastructure and systems management Infrastruktur och systemförvaltning 
  1.2.7 Privacy incident and breach management Incidenthantering 
  1.2.8 Supporting resources Tillgängliga resurser  
  1.2.9 Qualifications of internal personnel Kvalifikationer på interna resurser 
  1.2.10 Privacy awareness and training Utbildning och medvetenhet 
  1.2.11 Changes in regulatory and business 
requirements 
Förändrade kravställningar 
2.0  
 
Notice Integritetsmeddelande 
 2.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
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  2.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för information till registrerade 
  2.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 2.2  Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  2.2.1 Provision of notice Tillhandahålla integritetsmeddelande 
  2.2.2 Entities and activities covered Omfattning av aktiviteter och enheter 
  2.2.3 Clear and conspicuous Klar- och tydlighet 
3.0  
 
Choice and consent Samtycke och valmöjligheter för 
individer 
 3.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  3.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för samtycke och valmöjligheter  
  3.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
  3.1.2 Consequences of denying or withdrawing 
consent 
Konsekvenser för nekande och 
återkallelse 
 3.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  3.2.1 Implicit or explicit consent Underförstått och uttryckligt samtycke 
  3.2.2 Consent for new purposes and uses Samtycke för nytt ändamål 
  3.2.3 Explicit consent for sensitive information Uttryckligt samtycke för känsliga 
uppgifter 
  3.2.4 Consent for online data transfers to or 
from an individual’s computer or other 
similar electronic devices 
Samtycke för tillgång till och från 
individers enheter  
4.0  
 
Collection Insamling av data 
 4.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  4.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för insamling av data 
  4.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
  4.1.2 Types of personal information collected 
and methods of collection 
Insamlingsmetoder och kategorier av 
personuppgifter 
 4.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  4.2.1 Collection limited to identified purpose Uppgiftsminimering 
  4.2.2 Collection by fair and lawful means Rättvis och laglig insamling 
  4.2.3 Collection from third parties Insamling från tredjeparter 
  4.2.4 Information developed about individuals Profilering av individer 
5.0  
 
Use, retention, and disposal Användning, lagring och radering 
 5.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  5.1.0 Privacy policies Policy om användning, lagring och 
radering 
  5.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 5.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  5.2.1 Use of personal information Användning av personuppgifter 
  5.2.2 Retention of personal information Lagring av personuppgifter 
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  5.2.3 Disposal, destruction and redaction of 
personal information 
Rensning, gallring och arkivering av 
personuppgifter 
6.0  
 
Access Individers åtkomst till sina data 
 6.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  6.1.0 Privacy policies Policy om individers åtkomst till sina 
data 
  6.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 6.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  6.2.1 Access by individuals to their personal 
information 
Registerutdrag och registrerades 
rättigheter 
  6.2.2 Confirmation of an individual’s identity Begriplig information, tidsramar och 
kostnader 
  6.2.3 Understandable personal information, 
time frame, and cost 
Verifiering av identitet 
  6.2.4 Denial of access Nekande av tillgång till 
personuppgifter 
  6.2.5 Updating or correcting personal 
information 
Uppdatering, korrigering, begränsning 
och invändning av personuppgifter 
  6.2.6 Statement of disagreement Nekande av ändring eller begränsning 
7.0  
 
Disclosure to third parties Utlämnande till tredjeparter 
 7.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  7.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för utlämning till tredjeparter 
  7.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
  7.1.2 Communication to third parties Kommunikation till tredjeparter 
 7.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  7.2.1 Disclosure of personal information Utlämning av personuppgifter 
  7.2.2 Protection of personal information Skriftligt avtal som skydd för 
personuppgifter 
  7.2.3 New purposes and uses Utlämnande för nya ändamål 
  7.2.4 Misuse of personal information by a third 
party 
Felaktig användning av 
personuppgifter av tredjeparter 
8.0  
 
Security for privacy Informationssäkerhet 
 8.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  8.1.0 Privacy policies Informationssäkerhetspolicy 
  8.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 8.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  8.2.1 Information security program Organisation av 
informationssäkerhetsarbetet 
  8.2.2 Logical access controls Logiska säkerhetskontroller  
  8.2.3 Physical access controls Fysiska säkerhetskontroller 
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  8.2.4 Environmental safeguards Miljörelaterad säkerhet 
  8.2.5 Transmitted personal information Säkerhet vid överföring av 
personuppgifter 
  8.2.6 Personal information on portable media Säkerhet på mobila enheter 
  8.2.7 Testing security safeguards Granskningar av informationssäkerhet 
9.0  
 
Quality Kvalitet 
 9.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  9.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för kvalitet och riktighet 
  9.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 9.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  9.2.1 Accuracy and completeness of personal 
information 
Riktighet och fullständighet av 
personuppgifter 
  9.2.2 Relevance of personal information Relevans av personuppgifter 
10.0  
 
Monitoring and enforcement Övervakning och upprätthållande 
 10.1 
 
Policies and communications Policy, riktlinjer och kommunikation 
  10.1.0 Privacy policies Policy för övervakning och 
upprätthållande 
  10.1.1 Communication to individuals Kommunikation till individer 
 10.2 
 
Procedures and controls Rutiner, processer och kontroller 
  10.2.1 Inquiry, complaint and dispute process Utredning, klagomål och tvister 
  10.2.2 Dispute resolution and recourse Tvistlösning och tillämpning 
  10.2.3 Compliance review Efterlevnadskontroll 
  10.2.4 Instances of noncompliance Avvikelsehantering 
  10.2.5 Ongoing monitoring Övervakning av effektivitet av 
kontroller ur ett riskperspektiv 
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The full list of questions in the first questionnaire, the prioritisation score used in the analysis 
for the reduction of scope.  
 
In the analysis we gave the following prioritisation score to questions that were: 
1 for questions we considered as a key practice or are needed for completeness. 
2 for redundant questions, where the key practice is already mentioned, or answers are 
covered by another questions. 
3 for practices that is not considered common in a municipality context.  
 
 
Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
1 Har ni ett internt regelverk för hantering av 
integritets- och dataskyddsfrågor (till exempel 
integritetspolicy, dataskyddspolicy eller 
motsvarande)? 
Has regulations (internal 
policy) 
1 1.1.0 Privacy policies 
2 Välj de delar som täcks av ert regelverk: Scope of regulations 
(internal policy) 
1 
 
3 Hur gör ni då för att hantera regler internt om 
integritets- och dataskyddsfrågor?  
 
1 
 
4 Hur kommunicerar ni med personalen om regler 
internt gällande integritets- och 
dataskyddsfrågor? 
 
2 1.1.1 Communication to 
internal personnel 
5 Hur hanterar ledningen ansvar och skyldigheter 
för integritets- och dataskyddsfrågor? 
Defined roles and 
responsibilities exist 
1 1.1.2 Responsibility and 
accountability for policies 
6 Hur hanterar ledningen granskningar och 
godkännande av regelverk? 
 
2 1.2.1 Review and approval 
7 Utförs granskning av regelverk av interna och 
externa specialister? 
 
2 
 
8 Genomförs en ledningsgenomgång av regelverk 
inför granskning och godkännande? 
 
2 
 
9 Hur säkerställer ni att regelverket stämmer 
överens med lagstiftningen? 
Regulations are 
reviewed to ensure that 
1 1.2.2 Consistency of 
privacy policies and 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
they comply with 
legislation 
procedures with laws and 
regulations 
10 Sker en förebyggande bevakning av ny 
lagstiftning på dataskyddsområdet? 
 
2 
 
11 Genomförs en ledningsgenomgång av hur 
förändringar i lagstiftning påverkar det interna 
regelverket? 
 
2 
 
12 Har en informationsklassning för känslighet av 
personuppgifter utförs? 
Has classified 
information sensitivity 
1 1.2.3 Personal information 
identification and 
classification  
13 Hur omfattande är klassningen av behandlingar 
av personuppgifter? (Välj det alternativ som 
stämmer bäst) 
 
1 
 
14 Motsvarar skydd för tjänster och systemnivån av 
klassningen på personuppgifterna?  
 
2 
 
15 Finns en dokumenterad process för att uppdatera 
klassning inklusive riskbedömningar vid 
förändringar? 
 
2 
 
16 Har ni en process för riskhantering som omfattar 
risker för hot mot personuppgifter som er 
organisation hanterar? 
Risk process exists and 
is used 
1 1.2.4 Risk assessment 
17 Hur ofta genomför och uppdaterar ni 
bedömningar i er riskhanteringsprocess? 
 
1 
 
18 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på er 
riskhanteringsprocess: 
 
1 
 
19 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på er 
riskhanteringsprocess: 
 
1 
 
20 Hur gör ni då för att identifiera och hantera 
risker gällande personuppgifter? (Välj det 
alternativ som stämmer bäst) 
 
1 
 
21 Gör ni en intern granskning av att avtal 
innehåller reglering av personuppgifter? (t.ex. 
personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal, delningsavtal) 
Review agreements for 
personal information 
1 1.2.5 Consistency of 
commitments with privacy 
policies and procedures 
22 Hur omfattande är den interna granskningen av 
personuppgifter i era avtal? (Välj det alternativ 
som stämmer bäst) 
 
1 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
23 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på er 
process för interna granskningar personuppgifter 
i era avtal: 
 
2 
 
24 Gör ni en konsekvensbedömning av risker för 
hantering av personuppgifter vid införande av 
nya eller förändringar av befintliga processer? 
(t.ex. infrastruktur, system, applikationer, 
tjänster, produkter, databaser, mobil hantering, 
webbplatser, informationslagring) 
Data protection impact 
assessments are 
performed 
1 1.2.6 Infrastructure and 
systems management 
25 Hur omfattande är konsekvensbedömningar av 
personuppgifter vid införande av nya eller 
förändringar av befintliga processer? (Välj det 
alternativ som stämmer bäst) 
 
1 
 
26 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på er 
process för konsekvensbedömningar: 
 
2 
 
27 Har ni processer och rutiner för att säkerställa att 
personuppgiftsincidenter identifieras och 
hanteras på ett effektivt sätt? 
Incident process 
established 
1 1.2.7 Privacy incident and 
breach management 
28 Hur omfattande är er process för identifiering 
och hantering av personuppgiftsincidenter? 
(Välj det alternativ som stämmer bäst) 
 
1 
 
29 Välj de beskrivningar som stämmer med er 
process för identifiering och hantering av 
personuppgiftsincidenter: 
 
1 
 
30 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst er organisation 
gällande resurser för arbete att genomföra och 
stödja hanteringen av personuppgifter: (Här 
avses inte dataskyddsombudet, utan andra 
resurser) 
Available resources 
among staff 
1 1.2.8 Supporting resources 
31 Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in 
gällande kvalifikationer på intern personal som 
hanterar personuppgifter:  
Formal requirements for 
internal staff are 
available 
1 1.2.9 Qualifications of 
internal personnel 
32 Vilka typer av bakgrundskontroller genomförs 
för anställda som potentiellt har tillgång till 
konfidentiell information? (Välj en eller flera). 
   
33 Finns det en kärna av den interna personalen 
som är specialister på dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor?  
Data protection 
specialists are available 
1 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
34 Sker en bedömning av prestationen och 
kvaliteten sker minst årligen av personalen om 
hantering av dataskydd och integritetsfrågor? 
 
2 
 
35 Sker kompetensutveckling av intern personal 
som innefattar certifieringar inom "privacy" 
eller relaterade områden? 
 
1 
 
36 Hur ofta genomförs personalutbildning gällande 
dataskydd och integritetsfrågor? 
Education in privacy 
takes place 
1 1.2.10 Privacy awareness 
and training 
37 Välj den beskrivning som bäst om 
personalutbildning gällande dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor:  
Training program exist 1 
 
38 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in om 
utbildningsprogrammet gällande dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor: (Flera svar är möjliga) 
 
1 
 
39 Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in på 
hantering av förändringar i kravställningar för 
dataskydd och integritetsfrågor?  
 
Här eftersöks hur hantering sker av förändringar 
i lagstiftning, kontrakt, SLAer, branschkrav, 
processförändringar, personalförändringar, 
roller, ansvar och teknologi 
 
2 1.2.11 Changes in 
regulatory and business 
requirements 
40 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på 
förändringshanteringsprocessen gällande 
dataskydd och integritetsfrågor: (Flera svar är 
möjliga) 
 
2 
 
41 Hur lämnas information till registrerade om hur 
ni hanterar personuppgifter? 
Information to 
registered persons takes 
place 
1 2.2.1 Provision of notice 
42 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst stämmer in på 
informationen till registrerade: (Flera svar är 
möjliga) 
 
1 
 
43 Välj bland beskrivningarna om informationen 
till registrerade omfattar följande: (Flera svar är 
möjliga) 
 
2 2.2.2 Entities and activities 
covered 
44 Hur sker uppdatering av informationen till 
registrerade (Välj den beskrivning som bäst 
stämmer in): 
 
2 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
45 Hur är informationens tydlighet?  (Välj den 
beskrivning som stämmer in bäst): 
 
2 2.2.3 Clear and 
conspicuous 
46 Hur är följs informationens tydlighet upp?   
 
2 
 
47 Hur samlar ni in samtycke i de fall det behövs 
för insamling, användning eller utlämning av 
personuppgifter? 
 
3 3.2.1 Implicit or explicit 
consent 
48 Skickar ni en fråga om bekräftelse på individens 
samtycke vid ändringar på tjänsten eller 
hanteringen? 
 
3 
 
49 Sker en översyn av processen för insamling av 
samtycke regelbundet? 
 
3 
 
50 Hur hanteras nya ändamål som det tidigare 
samtycket inte täckte. (Välj den beskrivning 
som bäst stämmer in)? 
 
3 3.2.2 Consent for new 
purposes and uses 
51 Sker en verifiering av tjänster och system för att 
kontrollera att giltigt samtycke finns 
 
3 
 
52 Samlar ni in uttryckligt samtycke för känsliga 
uppgifter, där detta behövs? 
 
3 3.2.3 Explicit consent for 
sensitive information 
53 Välj bland beskrivningarna om uttryckligt 
samtycke för känsliga uppgifter: (Flera svar är 
möjliga) 
 
3 
 
54 Sker en fråga om samtycke för överföringar till 
eller från en individs dator eller annan enhet? 
(förutom cookies) 
 
3 3.2.4 Consent for online 
data transfers to or from an 
individual’s computer or 
other similar electronic 
devices 
55 Välj bland beskrivningarna om samtycke för 
överföringar till eller från en individs dator eller 
annan enhet: (Flera svar är möjliga)   
 
3 
 
56 Är insamlingen begränsad till att enbart samla in 
nödvändiga uppgifter som behövs för uppfylla 
ändamålet?  
 
3 4.2.1 Collection limited to 
identified purpose 
57 Välj bland beskrivningarna om insamling av 
enbart nödvändiga uppgifter som behövs för 
uppfylla ändamålet (Flera svar är möjliga)   
 
3 
 
58 Sker en granskning av att insamling av 
personuppgifter är laglig och rättvis? (t.ex. av ett 
dataskyddsombud eller en jurist) 
 
2 4.2.2 Collection by fair and 
lawful means 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
59 Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in på 
hur granskning av insamling är laglig och 
rättvis? 
 
2 
 
60 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning av processen 
om granskning av insamling är laglig och 
rättvis? 
 
2 
 
61 Hur hanteras klagomål om att insamling skulle 
ske ojuste eller olagligt? (Flera svar är möjliga)   
 
2 
 
62 Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer om att 
insamling av uppgifter från annan än den 
registrerade sker korrekt? (tredje part) 
 
2 4.2.3 Collection from third 
parties 
63 Sker en återkommande kontroll av tredje parters 
insamlingsmetoder? 
 
2 
 
64 Sker en uppföljning med att analysera 
insamlingsmetoder från tredje parter och införa 
förebyggande förändringar i kravställningar för 
framtida upphandlingar? 
 
2 
 
65 Hur informerar ni individer om ni 
sammanställer uppgifter om dem för att skapa 
en profil? (Välj den beskrivning som stämmer in 
bäst): 
 
3 4.2.4 Information 
developed about 
individuals 
66 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning av processen 
att informera om profilering? 
 
3 
 
67 Hur informeras individer om profilering? 
 
3 
 
68 Hur säkerställer ni att användning av 
personuppgifter sker på ett korrekt sätt? (Välj 
den beskrivning som stämmer in bäst) 
 
2 5.2.1 Use of personal 
information 
69 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning av processen 
att verifiera användning av personuppgifter? 
 
2 
 
70 Välj bland beskrivningarna om verifiering av 
användning sker på ett korrekt sätt.(Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
2 
 
71 Hur säkerställer ni att lagring av personuppgifter 
sker på ett korrekt sätt? (Välj den beskrivning 
som stämmer in bäst) 
Document management 
plan exists and works 
1 5.2.2 Retention of personal 
information 
72 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning av att 
dokumenthanteringsplan och verklig lagring 
överensstämmer? 
 
1 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
73 Välj bland beskrivningarna om hur verifiering 
av att lagring av personuppgifter sker på ett 
korrekt sätt. (Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
1 
 
74 Hur säkerställer ni att  rensning, arkivering och 
gallring av personuppgifter sker på ett korrekt 
sätt? (Välj den beskrivning som stämmer in 
bäst) 
 
2 5.2.3 Disposal, destruction 
and redaction of personal 
information 
75 Hur hanterar ni  begäran om registerutdrag? 
(Välj den beskrivning som stämmer in bäst) 
Process for registry 
extracts is available 
1 6.2.1 Access by individuals 
to their personal 
information 
76 Hur sker hantering av att söka fram registrerades 
personuppgifter till ett registerutdrag? (Välj den 
beskrivning som stämmer in bäst) 
 
1 
 
77 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning processen av 
söka fram registrerades personuppgifter till ett 
registerutdrag? 
 
2 
 
78 Hur gör ni för att registerutdrag ska vara 
begripligt, levererat inom rimlig tidsram och till 
en rimlig kostnad? (Välj den beskrivning som 
stämmer in bäst) 
 
2 6.2.2 Confirmation of an 
individual’s identity 
79 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning processen av 
söka fram registrerades personuppgifter till ett 
registerutdrag? 
 
2 
 
80 Hur ni säkerställer ni rätt identitet vid begäran 
om registerutdrag från registrerade? (Välj den 
beskrivning som stämmer in bäst) 
Identity verification 
process 
1 6.2.3 Understandable 
personal information, time 
frame, and cost 
81 Finns det spårbarhet i processen för att verifiera 
identitet? 
 
1 
 
82 Sker en regelbunden uppföljning av att 
processen för verifiera identitet?  
 
1 
 
83 Välj den beskrivning som stämmer in bäst för 
att kunna neka tillgång till personuppgifter. 
(T.ex. att en lag förhindrar det). 
 
3 6.2.4 Denial of access 
84 Finns en regelbunden uppföljning av nekanden? 
(t ex responstid, anledningar för nekande och 
hur kommunikationen hanterades) 
 
3 
 
85 Finns det en automatiserad funktion för nekande 
där så är möjligt? 
 
3 
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Nr Question Key Practices 
Prio 
score 
Criteria 
86 Hur hanterar ni  begäran om registrerades 
rättigheter förutom registerutdrag? (Välj den 
beskrivning som stämmer in bäst) 
 
2 6.2.5 Updating or 
correcting personal 
information 
87 Finns det spårbarhet i processen för att hantera 
data och begäran om ändringar? 
 
2 
 
88 Välj bland beskrivningarna om processen för 
hantering av registrerades rättigheter.(Flera svar 
är möjliga)  
 
2 
 
89 Välj den beskrivning som stämmer in bäst för 
att neka uppdatering, korrigering, begränsning 
eller invändning. (T.ex. en lag förhindrar det). 
 
2 6.2.6 Statement of 
disagreement 
90 Finns en regelbunden uppföljning av nekanden? 
(t ex responstid, anledningar för nekande och 
hur kommunikationen hanterades) 
 
2 
 
91 Finns det en automatiserad funktion för nekande 
där så är möjligt? 
 
2 
 
92 Välj den beskrivning som stämmer bäst in för 
att lämna ut personuppgifter till tredje part. 
 
2 7.2.1 Disclosure of 
personal information 
93 Sker det en granskning att processen för att  
lämna ut personuppgifter till tredje part 
överensstämmer med det interna regelverket? 
 
2 
 
94 Välj bland beskrivningarna för att lämna ut 
personuppgifter till tredje part.(Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
2 
 
95 Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer när det 
gäller skriftligt avtal som skydd för 
leverantörers hantering av personuppgifter: 
(Personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal ) 
Process for personal 
data bit agreement exists 
1 7.2.2 Protection of personal 
information 
96 Övervakas förändringar på tredje partens 
tekniska miljö för att säkerställa att de fortsatt 
lever upp till kravställningarna? 
 
1 
 
97 Finns en regelbunden bedömning av om 
processen för att teckna 
personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal? 
 
1 
 
98 Hur hanteras utlämnande för nya ändamål? (Välj 
den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in)? 
 
2 7.2.3 New purposes and 
uses 
99 Övervakas processen för hantering av 
utlämnande för nya ändamål? 
 
2 
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Prio 
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100 Välj bland beskrivningarna för att lämna ut 
personuppgifter till tredje part för nya 
ändamål.(Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
2 
 
101 Hur hanteras felaktig användning av 
personuppgifter av en tredje part? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in)? 
 
3 7.2.4 Misuse of personal 
information by a third party 
102 Sker en övervakning av processen för hantering 
av felaktigheter kan finnas hos en tredje part? 
 
3 
 
103 Sker en avvikelserapportering för olämplig eller 
oacceptabel användning av personuppgifter hos 
en tredje part? 
 
3 
 
104 Finns en plan för att hantera och avhjälpa 
olämplig eller oacceptabel användning av 
personuppgifter hos en tredje part? 
 
3 
 
105 Har ni en utpekad funktion, enhet eller 
åtgärdsprogram som systematiskt arbetar med 
informationssäkerhetsfrågor? (Program för 
informationssäkerhet) 
Has information 
security programs 
1 8.2.1 Information security 
program 
106 Välj de delar som omfattas av ert program för 
informationssäkerhet. (Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
1 
 
107 Hur hanteras informationssäkerhet i relation till 
skydd för personuppgifter? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
Information security is 
handled as a part of 
privacy 
1 
 
108 Välj de delar bland beskrivningarna som 
stämmer in på ert program för 
informationssäkerhet.(Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
2 
 
109 Genomförs årliga externa granskningar av hela 
programmet för att utvärdera effektiviteten? 
External audits of 
information security 
takes place 
1 
 
110 Hur hanteras säkerhet för personuppgifter 
gällande inloggning, behörigheter? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
 
2 8.2.2 Logical access 
controls 
111 Hur hanteras annat skydd för logisk access 
(intrångsförsök och otillåten användning)? 
(Flera svar är möjliga)  
Basic protection for 
logical access is 
available 
1 
 
112 Hur hanteras annat skydd för fysisk access? 
(Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
 
3 8.2.3 Physical access 
controls 
113 Hur övervakas skydd för fysisk access? (Flera 
svar är möjliga)  
 
3 
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Prio 
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Criteria 
114 Hur hanteras annat skydd mot naturkatastrofer 
och miljöfaror? (Välj den beskrivning som bäst 
stämmer in) 
 
3 8.2.4 Environmental 
safeguards 
115 Hur sker arbetet med kontinuietetsplanen? 
(Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
3 
 
116 Hur hanteras skydd vid överföring via nätverk 
och via fysisk transport? (Välj den beskrivning 
som bäst stämmer in) 
 
2 8.2.5 Transmitted personal 
information 
117 Hur sker arbetet med skydd vid överföring via 
nätverk och via fysisk transport? (Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
2 
 
118 Hur hanteras skydd för mobila enheter (bärbara 
datorer, surfplattor och smartphones)? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
Protection for mobile 
devices is available 
1 8.2.6 Personal information 
on portable media 
119 Hur sker arbetet med skydd för mobila enheter, 
som till exempel bärbara datorer, surfplattor och 
smartphones? (Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
1 
 
120 Hur testas effektiviteten av säkerhetsåtgärder för 
organisatorisk, teknisk och fysisk säkerhet? 
(Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in)? 
Information security 
audits are performed 
and is defined 
1 8.2.7 Testing security 
safeguards 
121 Leder resultatet av testning till överlämning så 
att nya åtgärder införs eller att brister blir 
fixade? 
 
2 
 
122 Sker en analys av tester för att finna 
bakomliggande orsaker (root cause) med vidare 
hantering för förbättringar av hela 
organisationens säkerhet? 
Analysis of underlying 
causes (root cause) 
1 
 
123 Hur säkerställs kvaliteten på personuppgifter, 
dess riktighet och fullständighet för ändamålet 
med behandlingen? (Välj den beskrivning som 
bäst stämmer in) 
 
2 9.2.1 Accuracy and 
completeness of personal 
information 
124 Välj på vilket sätt arbetet med att säkerställa 
kvaliteten på personuppgifter sker. (Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
2 
 
125 Hur säkerställs relevansen på personuppgifter 
för ändamålet med behandlingen? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
 
2 9.2.2 Relevance of personal 
information 
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126 Välj på vilket sätt arbetet med att säkerställa att 
endast personuppgifter som är relevanta 
behandlas. (Flera svar är möjliga)  
 
2 
 
127 Hur sker hantering och utredning av klagomål 
och tvister gällande personuppgiftsbehandling? 
(Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer in)? 
 
3 10.2.1 Inquiry, complaint 
and dispute process 
128 Välj på vilket sätt arbetet utreda och bemöta 
klagomål och hantera tvister sker.  (Flera svar är 
möjliga)   
 
3 10.2.2 Dispute resolution 
and recourse 
129 Hur sker hantering av kontroll av efterlevnad av 
regler, lagar samt andra externa och interna 
krav? (Välj den beskrivning som bäst stämmer 
in)? 
Compliance Control 
defined 
1 10.2.3 Compliance review 
130 Välj på vilket sätt arbetet med 
efterlevnadskontroll sker.  (Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
1 
 
131 Hur sker rapportering av avvikelser i efterlevnad 
samt korrigeringar? (Välj den beskrivning som 
bäst stämmer in) 
Deviation handling 
defined 
1 10.2.4 Instances of 
noncompliance 
132 Sker en uppföljning av avvikelseprocessen som 
leder till  ett förebyggande arbete för att möta 
nya avvikelser i framtiden? 
 
1 
 
133 Hur sker löpande övervakning av att kontroller 
och riskbedömningar är effektiva ? (Välj den 
beskrivning som bäst stämmer in) 
Monitoring 
effectiveness of controls 
exists 
1 10.2.5 Ongoing monitoring 
134 Välj bland beskrivningarna för hur mätning av 
kontrollers effektivitet sker .(Flera svar är 
möjliga)  
 
2 
 
 Legend: Q = Question number 
GAPP = Corresponding GAPP criteria 
A = Attributes 
Req. = Requirement for displaying the 
question 
M = Estimated maturity level 
N/A = Not applicable 
 
A0 = General questions 
A1 = Roles and responsibilities 
A2 = Governance and compliance 
A3 = Education and competence 
A4 = Processes and tools 
A5 = Risk and classification 
A6 = Incident and information security management 
 
 
1 
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Analysis template for scoring privacy maturity on survey question responses 
Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment 
1 N/A A0 
 
Är du som svarar 
Dataskyddsombud? 
1.1 Ja - N/A 
 
  
 
1.2 Nej - N/A 
 
  
 
1.3 Annat, specificera här: - N/A 
2 N/A A0 
 
Hur stor är den kommun du 
verkar för? 
2.1 Minst 200 000 invånare och 
största tätorten har minst 200 000 
invånare. 
- N/A 
 
  
 
2.2 Minst 50 000 invånare och största 
tätorten har minst 40 000 
invånare. 
- N/A 
 
  
  
2.3 Minst 15 000 invånare och största 
tätorten har minst 15 000 
invånare. 
- N/A 
 
  
  
2.4 Kommunens största tätort har 
färre än 15 000 invånare. 
- N/A 
 
  
  
2.5 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning. - N/A 
3 N/A A0 
 
Inom vilka 
verksamhetsområden arbetar 
du? (Flera svar är möjliga) 
3.1 Ledning, juridik, ekonomi, central 
service- och förvaltning 
- N/A 
 
  
 
3.2 Arbetsmarknadsfrågor - N/A 
 
  
  
3.3 Barnomsorg och 
förskoleverksamhet 
- N/A 
 
  
  
3.4 Kommunalt bolag - N/A 
 
  
  
3.5 Kultur och fritid - N/A 
 
  
  
3.6 Miljö- och hälsoskydd - N/A 
 
  
  
3.7 Ordning och säkerhet - N/A 
 
  
  
3.8 Plan- och byggfrågor - N/A 
 
  
  
3.9 Renhållning och avfallshantering - N/A 
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Legend: Q = Question number 
GAPP = Corresponding GAPP criteria 
A = Attributes 
Req. = Requirement for displaying the 
question 
M = Estimated maturity level 
N/A = Not applicable 
 
A0 = General questions 
A1 = Roles and responsibilities 
A2 = Governance and compliance 
A3 = Education and competence 
A4 = Processes and tools 
A5 = Risk and classification 
A6 = Incident and information security management 
 
2 
Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment  
  
  
3.10 Räddningstjänst - N/A 
 
  
  
3.11 Samhällsbyggnad - N/A 
 
  
  
3.12 Socialtjänst - N/A 
 
  
  
3.13 Utbildning för barn och ungdom - N/A 
 
  
  
3.14 Vattenförsörjning och avlopp - N/A 
 
  
  
3.15 Vuxenutbildning - N/A 
 
  
  
3.16 Vård och omsorg av äldre och 
funktionshindrade 
- N/A 
 
  
  
3.17 Annat, specificera här: - N/A 
4 1.1.0 A2 
 
Har ni ett internt regelverk för 
hantering av integritets- och 
dataskyddsfrågor? 
4.1 Ja 3 
 
 
  
 
4.2 Delvis 2 
 
 
  
 
4.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
4.4 Vet ej 1 
 
5 1.1.0 A2 If 4.1 or 
4.2 
Välj de delar som täcks av ert 
regelverk: 
5.1 Förvaltning, ansvar och roller 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.2 Information till registrerade 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.3 Samtycken 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.4 Insamling av data 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.5 Användning, bevarande, gallring 
och förstöring av data 
4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.6 Utlämning till tredjeparter 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.7 Informationssäkerhet 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4 
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GAPP = Corresponding GAPP criteria 
A = Attributes 
Req. = Requirement for displaying the 
question 
M = Estimated maturity level 
N/A = Not applicable 
 
A0 = General questions 
A1 = Roles and responsibilities 
A2 = Governance and compliance 
A3 = Education and competence 
A4 = Processes and tools 
A5 = Risk and classification 
A6 = Incident and information security management 
 
3 
Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment  
  
  
5.8 Individers åtkomst till sina data 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.9 Kvalitet och riktighet av 
personuppgifter 
4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.10 Uppföljning och efterlevnad 4 or 5 If all 10 = 4;  
Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
5.11 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
6 1.2.2 A2 If 4.1 or 
4.2 
Hur säkerställer ni att 
regelverket stämmer överens 
med lagstiftningen? 
6.1 Jämförelser med lagstiftning sker 
delvis, men är inte komplett 
1 
 
 
  
 
6.2 En granskning av 
överensstämmelse med 
lagstiftning sker, men utan 
dokumenterad vägledning 
2 
 
 
  
  
6.3 En process är införd för att 
återkommande genomföra 
jämförelser med lagstiftning. 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4 
 
  
  
6.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
7 1.1.0 A2 If 4.3 or 
4.4 
Hur gör ni då för att hantera 
regler internt om integritets- 
och dataskyddsfrågor? 
7.1 Regelverk är under framtagning 1 
 
 
  
  
7.2 Regler existerar inte 1 
 
 
  
  
7.3 Regler finns, men är inte fullt 
dokumenterade 
1 
 
 
  
  
7.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
8 1.2.3 A5 
 
Har en informationsklassning 
för känslighet av 
personuppgifter utförs? 
8.1 Ja 2 
 
 
  
 
8.2 Delvis 1 
 
 
  
 
8.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
8.4 Vet ej 1 
 
9 1.2.3 A5 If 8.1 or 
8.2 
Hur omfattande är klassningen 
av behandlingar av 
personuppgifter? 
9.1 Ingen fullständig klassning är 
gjord, den är inaktuell eller det 
saknas delar 
1 
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9.2 Grundläggande klassning är 
gjord, men saknar fullständiga 
riskbedömningar 
2 
 
 
  
  
9.3 Alla behandlingar är klassade och 
har riskbedömningar 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
  
9.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
10 1.2.4 A5 
 
Har ni en process för 
riskhantering som omfattar 
risker för hot mot 
personuppgifter som er 
organisation hanterar? 
10.1 Ja 2 
 
 
  
 
10.2 Delvis 1 
 
 
  
 
10.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
10.4 Vet ej 1 
 
11 1.2.4 A5 If 10.1 
or 10.2 
Hur ofta genomför och 
uppdaterar ni bedömningar i er 
riskhantering? 
11.1  Flera gånger per år - No change 
 
  
 
11.2  En gång per år - No change 
 
  
 
11.3  Mindre ofta - No change 
 
  
  
11.4  Annat, specificera här: - No change 
12 1.2.4 A5 If 10.1 
or 10.2 
Välj de beskrivningar som bäst 
stämmer in på er riskhantering: 
12.1 Anställda är överlag medvetna 
om integritetsrisker 
2 
 
 
  
 
12.2 Ett formellt fastställt ramverk för 
identifiering, bedömning och 
rapportering finns dokumenterad 
3 
 
 
  
 
12.3 Uppdatering av regelverk och 
processer sker som en följd av 
riskbedömningar 
3 or 4 12.3 and 12.5 = 4, 
else 3 
 
  
  
12.4 Ett IT-verktyg används för 
hantering och dokumentation av 
risker (Ej Excel eller 
motsvarande) 
- No change 
 
  
  
12.5 Interna och externa revisioner 
genomförs som innefattar risker 
för personuppgifter. 
3 or 4 12.3 and 12.5 = 4, 
else 3 
 
  
  
12.6 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
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13 1.2.4 A5 If 12.3, 
12.4 or 
12.5 
Välj de beskrivningar som bäst 
stämmer in på er 
riskhanteringsprocess: 
13.1 En anpassad riskhantering sker 
för olika verksamheter 
5 13.1 and 13.3 = 5, 
else no change 
 
  
  
13.2 Ett centralt riskregister finns 
etablerat med samtliga risker som 
identifierats. 
- No change 
 
  
  
13.3 En formell bedömning av 
effektiviteten av riskhanteringen 
genomförs regelbundet och 
processförändringar införs 
5 13.1 and 13.3 = 5, 
else no change 
 
  
  
13.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
14 1.2.4 A5 If 10.3 
or 10.4 
Hur gör ni då för att identifiera 
och hantera risker gällande 
personuppgifter? 
14.1 Risker identifieras och hanteras 
sporadiskt 
1 
 
 
  
 
14.2 Risker identifieras och hanteras, 
men inte fullt dokumenterat 
1 
 
 
  
 
14.3 Risker identifieras och hanteras 
inte 
1 
 
 
  
  
14.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
 
  
  
14.5 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
15 1.2.6 A5 
 
Gör ni en 
konsekvensbedömning av 
risker för hantering av 
personuppgifter vid införande 
av nya eller förändringar av 
befintliga processer? 
15.1 Ja 2 
 
 
  
 
15.2 Delvis 1 
 
 
  
 
15.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
 
15.4 Vet ej 1 
 
16 1.2.6 A5 If 15.1 
or 15.2 
Hur omfattande är 
konsekvensbedömningar av 
personuppgifter vid införande 
av nya eller förändringar av 
befintliga processer? 
16.1 Konsekvensbedömningar sker 
sporadiskt för nya 
verksamhetsprocesser och 
införande av nya system 
1 
 
 
  
 
16.2 Konsekvenser bedöms vid 
införande och vid förändringar av 
system, men är informella och 
inte fullt dokumenterade 
2 
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16.3 Konsekvensbedömningar sker i 
en formell process, som täcker 
införande och förändringar i 
produkter, tjänster, verksamhet 
och infrastruktur 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4 
 
  
  
16.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
17 1.2.7 A6 
 
Har ni rutiner för att säkerställa 
att personuppgiftsincidenter 
identifieras och hanteras på ett 
effektivt sätt? 
17.1 Ja 1 
 
 
  
 
17.2 Delvis 1 
 
 
  
 
17.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
17.4 Vet ej 1 
 
18 1.2.7 A6 If 17.1 
or 17.2 
Hur omfattande är er process 
för identifiering och hantering 
av personuppgiftsincidenter? 
18.1 En rutin finns, men den är inte 
fullt dokumenterad och 
hanteringen är ad hoc. 
1 
 
 
  
 
18.2 En process har utvecklats, men 
personalen har inte fått tillräcklig 
utbildning. 
2 
 
 
  
  
18.3 En dokumenterad process är 
implementerad som inkluderar 
ägarskap, identifiering av 
incidenter, riskbedömningar, 
skadebegränsning, 
kommunikation och uppföljning. 
3 
 
 
  
  
18.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning. 1 
 
19 1.2.7 A6 If 18.3 Välj de beskrivningar som 
stämmer med er process för 
identifiering och hantering av 
personuppgiftsincidenter: 
19.1 Incidenthanteringsprocessen 
testas genom övningar som även 
inkluderar ledningen. 
4 
 
 
  
 
19.2 Övervakning sker med tekniska 
kontroller för att identifiera 
incidenter. 
- No change 
 
  
  
19.3 Ledningen genomför 
bedömningar av 
incidenthanteringsplanen 
regelbundet eller när en incident 
skett för att förbättra processen. 
5 Req. 19.1 and 2 of 
3 of 19.3-19.5 = 5 
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19.4 Avtal finns med externa resurser 
för att genomföra exempelvis IT-
forensiska undersökningar för att 
säkra bevis. 
5 Req. 19.1 and 2 of 
3 of 19.3-19.5 = 5 
 
  
  
19.5 Ett incidentteam är etablerat och 
har beredskap för att snabbt 
kunna kallas samman. 
5 Req. 19.1 and 2 of 
3 of 19.3-19.5 = 5 
 
  
  
19.6 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
20 1.1.2 A1 
 
Hur hanterar ledningen ansvar 
och skyldigheter för integritets- 
och dataskyddsfrågor? 
20.1 Ingen ansvarig är utsedd 1 
 
 
  
 
20.2 Ansvarig person eller grupp är 
utsedd, men resurser och mandat 
är begränsade. 
2 
 
 
  
  
20.3 Definierade roller och ansvar 
finns. En dokumenterad process 
används för att utveckla 
regelverket. 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4 
 
  
  
20.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
21 1.2.8 A1 
 
Välj de beskrivningar som bäst 
stämmer gällande resurser för 
arbete att genomföra och 
stödja hanteringen av 
personuppgifter: 
21.1 Resurser tilldelas vid behov 
angående frågor om dataskydd. 
1 
 
 
  
 
21.2 Rutiner för hur man ska arbeta 
med har tagits fram, men utan 
stöd av specialister på dataskydd. 
2 
 
 
  
  
21.3 Personer finns tillgängliga med 
mandat och tillgång till resurser 
och stöd. 
3 
 
 
  
  
21.4 Ledningen säkerställer att det 
finns tillgängliga resurser 
genomgående för att stödja olika 
arbete med personuppgifter. 
4 
 
 
  
  
21.5 Ledningen har en årlig översyn av 
allt arbete och genomför 
förbättringar på lämplighet, 
tillgänglighet och prestationer av 
resurser. 
5 Req 21.4 
 
  
  
21.6 Annat, specificera här: 1 
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22 1.2.9 A3 
 
Välj den beskrivning som bäst 
stämmer in gällande 
kvalifikationer på intern 
personal som hanterar 
personuppgifter:  
22.1 Inga formella kvalifikationer finns 
specifikt för personal som 
hanterar personuppgifter. 
1 
 
 
  
  
22.2 Det finns kvalifikationer för delar 
av hanteringen av 
personuppgifter. Det sker en del 
utbildning som stöd. 
2 
 
 
  
  
22.3 Det finns formella krav på 
kvalifikationer för hanteringen av 
personuppgifter och 
dokumenterade 
arbetsbeskrivningar för anställda 
som har tillgång till konfidentiell 
och känslig information. 
3 
 
 
  
  
22.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
23 1.2.9 A3 If 22.3 Finns det en kärna av den 
interna personalen som är 
specialister på dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor? 
23.1 Ja 4 
 
 
  
 
23.2 Delvis 4 
 
 
  
 
23.3 Nej 3 
 
 
  
  
23.4 Vet ej 3 
 
24 1.2.9 A3 If 23.1 
or 23.2 
Sker kompetensutveckling av 
intern personal som innefattar 
certifieringar inom "privacy" 
eller relaterade områden? 
24.1 Ja 5 
 
 
  
 
24.2 Delvis 5 
 
 
  
  
24.3 Nej 4 
 
 
  
  
24.4 Vet ej 4 
 
25 1.2.10 A3 
 
Hur ofta genomförs 
personalutbildning gällande 
dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor? 
25.1 Aldrig 1 
 
 
  
 
25.2 En gång, vid anställning 1 
 
 
  
 
25.3 Vid anställning, och minst en 
gång per år 
2 
 
 
  
  
25.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
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26 1.2.10 A3 If 25.2 
or 25.3 
Välj den beskrivning som bäst 
stämmer in om 
personalutbildning gällande 
dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor: 
26.1 Ingen formell utbildning 
genomförs, utan kunskap sprids 
via mer kunniga i personalen. 
1 
 
 
  
 
26.2 Det förekommer kampanjer för att 
öka medvetenheten, men 
utbildningen är sporadisk och en 
sammanhållen utbildningsplan 
saknas. 
2 
 
 
  
  
26.3 Ett utbildningsprogram finns för 
både nya anställda och 
återkommande utbildning för 
personalen. Fördjupande 
utbildningar sker för de som 
behöver ytterligare kunskap. 
Utbildningsmaterial är anpassat 
för organisationen. 
3 
 
 
  
  
26.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
27 1.2.10 A3 If 26.3 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst 
stämmer in om 
utbildningsprogrammet 
gällande dataskydd och 
integritetsfrågor: 
27.1 E-utbildning sker för nyanställda 
och minst årligen för alla 
anställda. 
4 req 27.1 and 27.2  
 
  
 
27.2 De utbildningar som de anställda 
genomgått är dokumenterade och 
kan förekomma i 
utvecklingssamtal 
4 req 27.1 and 27.2 
 
  
 
27.3 Utbildningsprogrammet 
utvärderas återkommande för att 
täcka förändringar i regelverk och 
lagstiftningar. 
5 req 27.3 and 27.4 
 
  
  
27.4 En stark kultur gällande 
dataskydd finns. När det 
förekommer incidenter sker 
förnyad utbildning och 
informationskampanjer. 
5 req 27.3 and 27.4 
 
  
  
27.5 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
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28 2.2.1 A4 
 
Hur lämnas information till 
registrerade om hur ni hanterar 
personuppgifter? 
28.1 Det finns ingen generell 
information. Vi meddelar från 
gång till gång när det behövs. 
1 
 
 
  
 
28.2 Det finns information som 
beskriver hantering av 
personuppgifter på vår webbsida 
eller annan externt tillgänglig plats 
2 
 
 
  
  
28.3 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
 
  
  
28.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
29 2.2.1 A4 If 28.3 Välj de beskrivningar som bäst 
stämmer in på informationen till 
registrerade: 
29.1 Vi hänvisar till meddelandet på 
webbsidan. 
2 
 
 
  
 
29.2 Vi meddelar så snart det är 
praktiskt möjligt om vi avser 
använda personuppgifterna för ett 
annat ändamål. 
2 
 
 
  
 
29.3 Vi spårar versioner av 
meddelanden och kommunikation 
och vet vilken information som 
givits, vid varje givet tillfälle. 
3 req 29.1 - 29.2 
 
  
  
29.4 Vi har integrerat information i 
tjänsterna och denna är anpassad 
för den teknologi och plattform 
som används. 
4 req 29.1- 29.3 
 
  
  
29.5 Uppdateringar sker genom en 
etablerad process som tar hänsyn 
förändringar i regelverk, 
processer, som en följd av 
händelser och nya 
kravställningar. 
5 req 29.1-29-4 
 
  
  
29.6 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
30 5.2.2 A4 
 
Hur säkerställer ni att lagring 
av personuppgifter sker på ett 
korrekt sätt? 
30.1 En giltig dokumenthanteringsplan 
finns inte eller används sporadiskt 
1 
 
 
  
 
30.2 En dokumenthanteringsplan finns, 
men är inte fullt ut implementerad. 
2 
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30.3 En dokumenthanteringsplan finns 
som täcker in processer och 
rutiner som stämmer överens 
med hur det fungerar i praktiken. 
3 
 
 
  
  
30.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
31 5.2.2 A4 If 30.2 Sker en regelbunden 
uppföljning av att 
dokumenthanteringsplan och 
verklig lagring 
överensstämmer? 
31.1 Ja 4 
 
 
  
 
31.2 Delvis 3 
 
 
  
 
31.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
31.4 Vet ej - No change 
32 5.2.2 A4 If 31.1 
or 31.2 
Välj bland beskrivningarna om 
verifiering av lagring av 
personuppgifter sker på ett 
korrekt sätt: 
32.1 Verifiering av att lagringen 
stämmer enligt 
dokumenthanteringsplanen sker 
automatiskt. 
4 or 5 If all 3 = 5, If 2 of 3 
=4 
 
  
 
32.2 Lagring av personuppgifter 
granskas regelbundet i en 
lämplighetsbedömning. 
4 or 5 If all 3 = 5, If 2 of 3 
=4 
 
  
 
32.3 Förändringar eller avvikelser 
övervakas och processen 
uppdateras som en följd av detta. 
4 or 5 If all 3 = 5, If 2 of 3 
=4 
 
  
  
32.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
33 6.2.1 A4 
 
Hur hanterar ni begäran om 
registerutdrag? 
33.1 Det finns inget bestämt sätt, utan 
en begäran kan ske via e-post, 
telefon eller besök. 
1 
 
 
  
 
33.2 En process finns, men att skicka 
in en begäran sker manuellt. (t ex 
en PDF-fil på en webbsida som 
skickas per post). 
2 
 
 
  
 
33.3 En dokumenterad process finns 
implementerad som täcker alla 
aspekter av registerutdrag (t.ex. 
en digital tjänst) 
3 
 
 
  
  
33.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
34 6.2.1 A4 If 33.3 Hur sker hantering av att söka 
fram registrerades 
34.1 Sökning och sammanställning 
sker manuellt och sporadiskt 
- No change 
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personuppgifter till ett 
registerutdrag? 
34.2 Sökning och sammanställning 
sker manuellt enligt en process 
som återanvänds och utvecklas. 
4 If 33.3 and 34.2 = 
4 
 
  
 
34.3 Sökning och sammanställning 
sker automatiserat och med själv-
service i ett tekniskt system 
5 If 33.3 and 34.3 = 
5 
 
  
  
34.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning - No change 
35 6.2.2 A4 
 
Hur ni säkerställer ni rätt 
identitet vid begäran om 
registerutdrag från 
registrerade? 
35.1 Informellt och olika från fall till fall. 1 
 
 
   35.2 En metod finns på plats, men är 
manuell eller inte fullt 
dokumenterad. 
2 
 
 
   35.3 En dokumenterad och säker 
process för att bekräfta identitet 
används genomgående (t ex 
Bank-ID). 
3 
 
 
   
 
35.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
36 6.2.2 A4 If 35.3 Finns det spårbarhet i 
processen för att verifiera 
identitet? 
36.1 Ja 4 
 
 
  
  
36.2 Delvis 3 
 
 
  
  
36.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
36.4 Vet ej - No change 
37 6.2.2 A4 If 35.3 Sker en regelbunden 
uppföljning av att processen för 
att verifiera identitet? 
37.1 Ja 5 
 
 
  
  
37.2 Delvis 4 
 
 
  
  
37.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
37.4 Vet ej - No change 
38 1.2.5 A2 
 
Gör ni en intern granskning av 
att avtal innehåller reglering av 
personuppgifter?  
38.1 Ja 1 
 
 
  
 
38.2 Delvis 1 
 
 
  
 
38.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
38.4 Vet ej 1 
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39 1.2.5 A2 If 38.1 
or 38.2 
Hur omfattande är den interna 
granskningen av 
personuppgifter i era avtal? 
39.1 Ingen fullständig granskning av 
avtalen sker, granskningar är 
sporadiska och informella 
1 
 
 
  
 
39.2 Grundläggande granskning sker 
och avtal med leverantörer har en 
reglering (t.ex. 
personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal) 
2 
 
 
  
  
39.3 En komplett granskning av avtal 
utförs i en etablerad process som 
även inkluderar återkopplande 
uppföljning 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4 
 
  
  
39.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
40 7.2.2 A4 
 
Välj den beskrivning som bäst 
stämmer när det gäller skriftligt 
avtal som skydd för 
leverantörers hantering av 
personuppgifter: 
40.1 Hantering leverantörer är ad hoc. 
Rutiner saknas för att utvärdera 
leverantörens skydd för 
personuppgifter. 
1 
 
 
  
 
40.2 Process finns för att säkerställa 
ett skriftligt avtal finns. Rutiner 
finns för bedömning om 
leverantörer har ett rimligt skydd, 
men är inte generellt infört. 
2 
 
 
  
  
40.3 En dokumenterad process för 
hantering av 
personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal 
används inklusive specifika 
instruktioner och kravställningar. 
3 
 
 
  
  
40.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
 
  
  
40.5 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
41 7.2.2 A4 If 40.3 Finns en regelbunden 
bedömning av processen för 
att teckna 
personuppgiftsbiträdesavtal? 
41.1 Ja 4 
 
 
  
 
41.2 Delvis 3 
 
 
  
 
41.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
41.4 Vet ej - No change 
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Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment 
42 7.2.2 A4 If 40.3 Övervakas förändringar på 
tredje partens tekniska miljö för 
att säkerställa att de fortsatt 
lever upp till kravställningarna? 
42.1 Ja 5 
 
 
  
  
42.2 Delvis 4 
 
 
  
  
42.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
42.4 Vet ej - No change 
43 8.2.1 A2 
 
Hur hanteras 
informationssäkerhet i relation 
till skydd för personuppgifter? 
43.1 Skydd för personuppgifter 
relateras till och är underordnat 
arbetet med 
informationssäkerhet. 
1 
 
 
  
 
43.2 Skydd för personuppgifter och 
informationssäkerhet hanteras 
separat, men en integration är 
pågående. 
2 
 
 
  
  
43.3 Arbetet med informationssäkerhet 
omfattar hela verksamheten och 
hanteras som en del av skyddet 
för personuppgifter. 
3 
 
 
  
  
43.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
44 8.2.1 A6 
 
Har ni en utpekad funktion, 
enhet eller åtgärdsprogram 
som systematiskt arbetar med 
informationssäkerhetsfrågor? 
44.1 Ja 3 
 
 
  
 
44.2 Delvis 2 
 
 
  
 
44.3 Nej 1 
 
 
  
  
44.4 Vet ej 1 
 
45 8.2.1 A6 If 44.1 
or 44.2 
Genomförs årliga externa 
granskningar av hela 
programmet för att utvärdera 
effektiviteten? 
45.1 Ja 4 or 5 Level 5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4, else 
= 4  
  
 
45.2 Delvis 3 
 
 
  
 
45.3 Nej - No change 
 
  
  
45.4 Vet ej - No change 
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Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment 
46 8.2.2 A6 If 44.1 
or 44.2 
Hur hanteras skydd för logisk 
access (intrångsförsök och 
otillåten användning)? 
46.1 Tekniska system för 
intrångdetektering och 
övervakning är implementerade 
2 or 3 If 46.1 and 46.2 = 
3; if only one = 2; 
if none = 1; Level 
4-5 depends on 
52.1 - 52.4  
  
 
46.2 Regelbunden granskning av 
loggfiler för att finna spår av 
intrångsförsök och otillåten 
användning 
2 or 3 If 46.1 and 46.2 = 
3; if only one = 2; 
if none = 1; Level 
4-5 depends on 
52.1 - 52.4  
  
  
46.3 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
 
  
  
46.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
47 8.2.6 A6 
 
Hur hanteras skydd för mobila 
enheter (bärbara datorer, 
surfplattor och smartphones)? 
47.1 Rutiner och processer för en 
enhetlig hantering av skydd i 
mobila enheter saknas eller sker 
inte konsekvent. 
1 
 
 
  
 
47.2 Skydd för mobila enheter täcker 
inte alla delar. Funktioner för 
begränsningar finns tekniskt 
implementerade (t.ex. mobile 
device management). 
2 
 
 
  
  
47.3 Processer, rutiner och skydd för 
mobila enheter finns. En 
granskning av efterlevnaden sker. 
Dokumenterade tester sker av 
säkerheten. 
3 
 
 
  
  
47.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
48 8.2.6 A6 If 47.3 Hur sker arbetet med skydd för 
mobila enheter, som till 
exempel bärbara datorer, 
surfplattor och smartphones? 
48.1 Före en enhet lämnas ut till den 
anställde, krävs ett godkännande 
av regler. 
4 
 
 
  
 
48.2 Kontroll av efterlevnaden för 
skydd vid överföring via nätverk 
och via fysisk transport. 
4 
 
 
  
 
48.3 Ett kontinuerligt arbete sker för att 
ta del av och implementera nya 
och förbättrade metoder. 
5 If 48.1 or 48.2 and 
48.3 = 5 
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Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment  
  
  
48.4 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
49 8.2.7 A6 
 
Hur testas effektiviteten av 
säkerhetsåtgärder för 
organisatorisk, teknisk och 
fysisk säkerhet? 
49.1 Testning av säkerheten sker 
sporadiskt och oregelbundet. 
1 
 
 
  
 
49.2 Grundläggande testning sker 
periodiskt av olika 
säkerhetsfunktioner. Det kan ske 
med varierande omfattning. 
2 
 
 
  
  
49.3 Tester av säkerhetsåtgärder och 
funktioner sker minst årligen. 
Tester genomförs enhetligt och 
dokumenteras av kvalificerad 
personal för vidare hantering. 
3 
 
 
  
  
49.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
50 8.2.7 A6 If 49.3 Sker en analys av tester för att 
finna bakomliggande orsaker 
(root cause) med vidare 
hantering för förbättringar av 
hela organisationens säkerhet? 
50.1 Ja 5 
 
 
  
 
50.2 Delvis 4 Level 4-5 depends 
on 52.1-52.4  
  
 
50.3 Nej 3 
 
 
  
  
50.4 Vet ej 3 
 
51 10.2.3 A2 
 
Hur sker hantering av kontroll 
av efterlevnad av regler, lagar 
samt andra externa och interna 
krav? 
51.1 Efterlevnadskontroll sker 
sporadiskt och informellt 
1 
 
 
  
 
51.2 Efterlevnadskontroll sker 
regelbundet. Omfattningen är inte 
heltäckande eller helt 
dokumenterad. 
2 
 
 
  
 
51.3 Efterlevnadskontroll sker 
regelbundet enligt en 
dokumenterad process och täcker 
alla aspekter för efterlevnad av 
regler, lagar samt andra externa 
och interna krav. 
3 
 
 
  
  
51.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
52 10.2.3 A2 If 51.3 Välj på vilket sätt arbetet med 
efterlevnadskontroll sker. 
52.1 Kvalificerad personal gör 
efterlevnadskontroll av interna 
system och tjänster 
4 
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Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment  
  
 
52.2 Kvalificerad personal gör 
efterlevnadskontroll av 
leverantörer 
4 
 
 
  
  
52.3 Efterlevnadskontroller analyseras 
och granskas. 
5 req 52.1 or 52.2 
 
  
  
52.4 Efterlevnadskontroller leder till 
förebyggande åtgärder för att 
säkerställa vidare efterlevnad. 
5 req 52.1 or 52.2 
 
  
  
52.5 Annat, specificera här: - No change 
53 10.2.4 A2 
 
Hur sker rapportering av 
avvikelser i efterlevnad samt 
korrigeringar? 
53.1 Sporadiskt och informellt. 1 
 
 
  
 
53.2 Återkommande och systematiskt. 
Omfattningen är dock inte 
heltäckande eller helt 
dokumenterad. 
2 
 
 
  
 
53.3 En dokumenterad process och 
rutiner finns, inklusive eventuella 
disciplinåtgärder. Alla avvikelser 
är fullt dokumenterade. 
3 
 
 
  
  
53.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
54 10.2.4 A2 If 53.3 Sker en uppföljning av 
avvikelseprocessen som leder 
till ett förebyggande arbete för 
att möta nya avvikelser i 
framtiden? 
54.1 Ja 5 
 
 
  
 
54.2 Delvis 4 
 
 
  
 
54.3 Nej 3 
 
 
  
  
54.4 Vet ej 3 
 
55 10.2.5 A1 
 
Hur sker löpande övervakning 
av att kontroller och 
riskbedömningar är effektiva? 
55.1 Informellt och inte på ett 
konsekvent sätt 
1 
 
 
  
 
55.2 Kontroll av effektiviteten sker 
genom mätning, men är inte 
heltäckande 
2 
 
 
  
 
55.3 En dokumenterad process och 
rutiner finns för att regelbundet 
mäta effektiviteten av kontroller. 
Urvalet av kontroller och hur ofta 
de sker baseras på 
riskbedömning. 
3 Level 4-5 depends 
on 13.1-13.3 
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Q GAPP A Req. Questions Responses M Comment  
  
  
55.4 Vet ej/ingen uppfattning 1 
 
56 N/A A0 
 
Har du några kommentarer 
eller synpunkter? Beskriv här 
56.1 
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Appendix 4 – Privacy risks areas in the municipalities 
Report nr: 2019:009 
 
Summary of risks related to Swedish municipalities identified in a report by to the Privacy 
Committee (SOU 2016:41) 
A Swedish Government parliamentary committee outlined IT-related risks of breaches of 
privacy in society in the report Hur står det till med den personliga integriteten? – En 
kartläggning av Integritetskommittén (Integritetskommittén, 2016) and draws the conclusion 
that the individual’s privacy is diminishing in a number of areas. The committee have 
classified risks in three levels; some risk, obvious risk and serious risk.  
A summary of privacy risks and risk levels relevant to municipalities 
Area of concern Risk level Comments 
So
m
e 
O
bv
io
us
 
Se
rio
us
 
School Learning analytical methods and working methods gain ground and begin to be 
used by schools and system suppliers, which gives rise to general risks for 
"digital tattoos", which characterize and follow students through the education 
system and later the working life. 
Digital learning platforms 
and teaching aids   x 
Information can be used for entirely new purposes without the 
possibility of transparency. Free services have personal 
information and profiling as a business concept — weak privacy 
protection. 
Social media in teaching   x 
Unwanted confusion of data by the private and school-related. 
Difficult for students to abstain. 
Student Health x   Sensitive data, but detailed regulations exist and apply. 
Single-sign-on 
x   
Single-sign-on may entail a risk that sensitive personal 
information will get more spread than desired, but generally, 
school federation gives better privacy protection. 
Camera surveillance in 
schools  x  
It is regulated in the camera surveillance law and seen as 
relatively close-knit that cameras capture students' everyday life. 
Decisions are often made at a lower level; the reason is 
inadequate and not documented. 
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Area of concern Risk level Comments 
So
m
e 
O
bv
io
us
 
Se
rio
us
 
Working life A definite risk is a shifting purpose when employers digitally handle information 
about employees. Legitimate interests can be applied to employees also for 
authorities, in their role as employers. The Data protection authority has been 
historically relatively permissive. Risks of weakening for workers and exclusion 
from working life. 
Positioning and other 
monitoring of activities and 
behaviours 
  
x Employees have few opportunities to influence because of the 
employers supervisory right according to the managerial 
prerogative and employees lack knowledge. It is a risk that the 
purpose of positioning glides over in other purposes. It is also 
difficult to control due to the use of external suppliers (cloud 
services) 
Social Media x 
  
The employer enters a private sphere, but easy for workers to 
restrict access to statements that may be sensitive or 
controversial. 
Expertise databases and 
background checks 
x   
Individual tasks may be sensitive, but dissemination is likely to 
be limited. 
Camera surveillance   x 
Many employers misuse protective legislation and use camera 
surveillance for other purposes. 
Healthcare and social 
services 
The healthcare system has many challenges and extensive regulations regarding 
how sensitive information should be handled and at the same time, amounts with 
actors nationally, regionally and locally. Several supervisory bodies exist, and it is 
difficult to give a general assessment. 
Healthcare 
  
x 
Quantities of risks have been identified due to shortcomings in 
management, compliance, coordination, complexity, 
interoperability, information security, information sharing. 
Amounts of sensitive information are not properly handled — 
dangers of spreading personal data. 
Welfare technology and 
digital services within the 
social services 
  
x 
Digitisation such as camera surveillance, GPS transmitters, 
robots and sensors etc. involves close management. Unclear 
legislation on how individuals with reduced ability to make 
decisions can be offered services using welfare technology. 
Lack of responsibility for how tasks are handled. 
 
E-government 
The individual has little influence over authority management. The technical 
development poses a risk of unwanted dissemination of personal data. 
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Area of concern Risk level Comments 
So
m
e 
O
bv
io
us
 
Se
rio
us
 
Information management 
within and between different 
authorities 
 
x 
 
A risk that sensitive information is not handled correctly in 
communication between authorities. Personal information can 
spread to administrators who do not need to take part in these. 
 
Information exchange with 
individuals 
x 
  
Design of e-services can provide inadequate protection. Data 
can be disseminated following an antagonistic attack (cyber-
attack) directed against the authority. 
 
Authorities with information 
in the cloud and the lack of 
client expertise 
  
x External parties can handle a large number of sensitive personal 
data and general risks are deficiencies in competence, regarding 
the application of information security, law and requirements. 
 
Authorities in social media 
and with like buttons on the 
web 
x 
  
A risk that sensitive personal data ends up in third countries 
without the existence of exact legal mechanisms and that third 
parties are profiling individuals unlawfully. 
 
PSI legislation 
 
x 
 
Hard to apply and partly unclear legislation, which can lead to 
incorrect assessments and the risk that personal data will be 
discharged and also involves an unauthorised shifting of 
purpose. 
 
Citizen profiling and online 
controls 
  
x Difficult to control how authorities use personal data to make 
predictive analyses (analyse applications with other data and 
with statistical patterns find potential risks) for preventive control 
activities. 
Information Security 
(Application) 
  
x The majority of municipalities do not work systematically with 
information security, which means that there is a risk that 
sensitive personal data can be discarded. 
Other issues     
Cloud Services   x Often, there is a lack of a comprehensive risk and vulnerability 
analysis and incorrect assumptions about the service provider's 
security activities. Loss of transparency and control involves the 
risk that you will be handled for the providers own purposes. 
Free services are often based on the supplier's desire to use 
personal data for their purposes. Hard to know where data are 
stored are physically. A risk that data stored in third countries 
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Area of concern Risk level Comments 
So
m
e 
O
bv
io
us
 
Se
rio
us
 
are being examined by foreign authorities' law enforcement 
authorities, without the possibility of transparency. 
 
Big data    x The basic idea of big data is difficult to reconcile with privacy 
protection. The principle is based on the belief that all data can 
be useful in the future. The purpose cannot be foreseen, and 
thus, any consent becomes unclear. Co-processing of large 
amounts of data means that anonymous data can be re-
identified — dissemination of personal data to parties that are 
not known to the individual. Influence and knowledge are lost. 
 
Biometry  x  Cheaper technology in combination with biometric data (many 
different biometric techniques) and other data handled digitally, 
can make identification of individuals easy (for example, facial 
recognition), making it difficult to remain anonymous. DNA can 
reveal health, disease or ethnic origin. Identity theft risks. Risk of 
over-utilisation and shifting purposes. 
 
 
